The respondents were trustees of the Stefan Antoni Family Trust, owning a property adjacent to a property owned by the deceased estate of the late Mr Frank Robarts. The appellant, Michael Robarts, was the testamentary heir to the deceased estate and resided on the Robarts property. Both properties were located in Bantry Bay, Cape Town, and enjoyed views of the Atlantic Ocean. The Robarts property was situated directly in front of the trust property and could affect the trust property's sea views if developed vertically. In late 2011, Robarts began developing the Robarts property, which had been damaged by fire, intending to move in. The respondents, through their town planner, complained that the development breached various restrictive conditions in the title deed. After negotiations between the parties' town planners, a meeting was held on 25 July 2012. The respondents alleged that at this meeting an oral agreement was reached whereby Robarts would register height servitudes over the Robarts property in favor of the trust property in exchange for the respondents not objecting to Robarts' applications for zoning scheme departures and title deed amendments. Robarts disputed that a firm agreement was reached. Following the meeting, various draft agreements were exchanged between the parties, with material differences. Antoni eventually signed a draft prepared by Robarts on 29 January 2013 under pressure due to the sale of the trust property. Robarts refused to register the servitudes, prompting the respondents to seek specific performance.
The appeal was upheld with costs including the costs of two counsel where employed. The order of the Western Cape High Court was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the application and directing the applicants (respondents in the appeal) to pay the respondents' (appellant's) costs of suit including the costs of two counsel and the wasted costs occasioned by the hearing on 28 February 2013.
The binding legal principles established by this case are: (1) Praedial servitudes, including height servitudes, constitute an 'interest in land' as envisaged in section 1(b) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 because they are real rights which diminish the dominium of the owner's rights in the servient property. (2) An agreement granting servitudes in exchange for zoning scheme departures and title deed amendments constitutes an 'alienation' by 'exchange' within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. (3) Section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act requires agreements for the alienation of servitudes to be in writing and signed by the parties to be valid and enforceable. (4) A counter-offer amounts to a rejection of the original offer, causing the original offer to lapse and become incapable of acceptance unless revived by the offeror. (5) An offer that has been rejected cannot thereafter be accepted to form a binding contract.
The court made the following non-binding observations: (1) If it were accepted that a written agreement had been concluded, the respondents would face a practical problem because on their version they concluded the oral agreement with the executors of the Robarts estate but the written agreement was with Robarts acting in his sole interest, meaning the executors were not party to the written instrument and it could not be enforced against the estate. (2) The court noted that if the respondents' reliance on an oral agreement had been properly pleaded and argued, Robarts might have sought a referral of the matter to oral evidence given the material disputes of fact regarding what was agreed at the meeting of 25 July 2012. (3) The court observed that all indications on the facts showed that the parties intended to be bound only by a written and signed agreement as contended by Robarts. (4) The court commented that Robarts would have been considerably prejudiced if the respondents were allowed to change their case on appeal from relying on a written agreement to an oral agreement, as he might have conducted his case very differently.
This case is significant in South African law for clarifying the application of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 to agreements granting servitudes. It establishes that height servitudes constitute an 'interest in land' within the meaning of the Act and that agreements granting such servitudes in exchange for other rights or concessions constitute 'alienation' by exchange. Such agreements must therefore comply with the formality requirements of section 2(1) of the Act, namely that they must be in writing and signed by the parties. The case also reinforces important principles of contract law regarding offer and acceptance, particularly that a counter-offer constitutes a rejection of the original offer which then lapses and cannot be accepted unless revived. The judgment also emphasizes the importance of parties maintaining consistency in their case theory between the trial court and appeal, and the prejudice that can result from changing legal positions on appeal.