The appellant was the owner of a Toyota Hiace commuter omnibus. On 4 March 2013, he drove the omnibus from Mutorashanga to Mvurwi with 15 passengers on board. He was stopped by police and arrested when it was discovered that: (1) he was not a holder of a driver's licence; (2) he did not possess valid authority to ply the Mvurwi-Mutorashanga route; and (3) he did not have a valid certificate of fitness for the omnibus issued by the Vehicle Inspection Department. The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted on 8 March 2013 of contravening s 6(1) of the Road Traffic Act (driving without a licence), s 39 of the Road Motor Transport Act, and s 18 as read with s 39 of the Road Motor Transport Act. He was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for count 1, and $20 (or 4 days imprisonment in default) for counts 2 and 3 respectively. The appellant explained that he drove the omnibus because his driver was sick and he was taking it to Mvurwi to give to another licensed driver, and that he was the only public transport service provider along that route.
The appeal was dismissed. The conviction and sentence were confirmed. The court amended the charges in counts 2 and 3 to the appropriate statutory provisions (contravention of s 7(1)(b)(iv) and s 12(1) as read with s 39 of the Road Motor Transportation Act [Chapter 13:15]) but found no prejudice was occasioned by the wrong citation.
Special reasons under s 6(5) of the Road Traffic Act are reasons that are out of the ordinary and peculiar to the offence and the offender. Economic expediency and the absence of alternative drivers do not constitute special reasons to avoid the minimum mandatory sentence for driving without a licence. Driving a public vehicle carrying passengers without a licence constitutes a form of negligence in itself, as it puts passengers' lives at risk. An appellate court will only interfere with a sentence where the magistrate exercised sentencing discretion injudiciously; a sentence within the statutory range that properly considers aggravating and mitigating factors will be upheld.
The court noted that the appropriate charges in counts 2 and 3 should have been contravention of s 7(1)(b)(iv) and s 12(1) as read with s 39 of the Road Motor Transportation Act [Chapter 13:15] respectively, citing the proper chapter number assigned by SI 262 of 2006. However, it observed that no prejudice was occasioned by the incorrect citation. The court also commented that it would have been 'debatable' had the appellant been driving the sick driver to hospital, suggesting this might potentially constitute a special reason, though this was obiter as it was not the factual situation before the court.
This case clarifies the interpretation of 'special reasons' under s 6(5) of the Road Traffic Act for avoiding minimum mandatory sentences for driving without a licence. It establishes that economic expediency and operational convenience do not constitute special reasons. The case also demonstrates the courts' approach to sentencing in road traffic offences involving public transport, emphasizing the protection of passengers' lives and the seriousness of driving public vehicles without proper licensing and certification. It reinforces that appellate courts will not interfere with sentences within the magistrate's discretion unless there has been an injudicious exercise of that discretion.