The applicant sought to register an arbitral award issued by an independent arbitrator, Mr A.J. Manase, with the High Court in terms of section 98(14) of the Labour Act. The award ordered the respondent to pay the applicant US$287,491.00. The respondent opposed the application on the basis that the arbitral award offended public policy in terms of sections 34 and 36 of the Arbitration Act. The respondent had also lodged an appeal with the Labour Court which was still pending. The respondent filed papers under a separate case (HC 5560/10) and sought to have both applications heard together.
1. The arbitral award issued by Mr A.J. Manase, an independent arbitrator, was registered in terms of section 98(14) of the Labour Act [Cap 28:01]. 2. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant US$287,491.00 in terms of the arbitral award. 3. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 89(6) of the Labour Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction of all courts other than the Labour Court in areas where the Labour Court has jurisdiction in the first instance; (2) In labour matters, the Labour Act takes precedence over the Arbitration Act and any other enactment; (3) Sections 34 and 36 of the Arbitration Act are not applicable in cases where the award sought to be challenged relates to a labour dispute; (4) The mechanisms for challenging arbitral awards in labour disputes are provided for in the Labour Act and may only be accessed through the Labour Court; (5) The High Court may register an arbitral award under section 98(14) of the Labour Act where the award has not been suspended or set aside on review or appeal in terms of the Labour Act.
The court made observations about the historical development of the Labour Court, noting that its predecessor, the Labour Relations Tribunal, was limited in its powers and jurisdiction, with decisions subject to review by the High Court. The court noted that even then, the High Court took the view that litigants must first exhaust internal remedies under the Labour Act before approaching it for relief. The court also commented on the proper procedure for responding to chamber applications, noting that the correct procedure would have been for the respondent to file a counter chamber application in terms of Rule 229A rather than incorporating papers from a separate application by reference. The court observed that the legislative intent in creating the Labour Court was to establish a parallel structure to the High Court to provide finality in labour litigation.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law as it clarifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court in labour matters and the relationship between the Labour Act and the Arbitration Act. It establishes that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters falling within section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and that the Arbitration Act is subordinate to the Labour Act in labour disputes. The case reinforces the principle that parties must exhaust remedies under the Labour Act through the Labour Court before seeking relief elsewhere. It provides important guidance on the proper forum for challenging arbitral awards in labour disputes and the registration of such awards.