The appellant, Kholile Jackson Tofa, was convicted of rape in the Bloemfontein Regional Court on 4 March 2011 and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The appellant and the complainant, Ms Nomsa Christonia Baadjie, lived in the same street and knew each other. The complainant had purchased liquor from the appellant's shebeen on several occasions. On the date in question, they had sexual intercourse at the appellant's house. The complainant alleged it was non-consensual rape. The appellant claimed they had been in a secret love relationship for over two years without sexual intimacy, and that on this occasion the complainant instigated consensual sexual intercourse while his wife was away. Immediately after the incident, the complainant went to her mother's house in a tearful state and reported the rape. She then laid a complaint with police and was medically examined. The J88 medical report showed no visible physical injuries except a superficial abrasion on the fossa navicularis indicative of probable penetration. The appellant's appeal against conviction was dismissed by the High Court, Free State Division (Lekale J and Zietsman AJ), which granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The appellant also brought an application to adduce further evidence, namely an affidavit allegedly from the complainant recanting her testimony, which she and the police officer who purportedly commissioned it denied as authentic.
1. The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed. 2. The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) An application to adduce further evidence on appeal must meet three requirements: (a) a reasonably sufficient explanation why the evidence was not led at trial; (b) prima facie likelihood of the truth of the evidence; and (c) material relevance to the trial outcome. Such applications are only granted in exceptional circumstances. (2) An appellate court may not interfere with factual findings of a trial court unless those findings are clearly wrong on the face of the record. (3) In rape cases where consent is the central issue, minor inconsistencies in a complainant's testimony regarding peripheral details do not necessarily vitiate credibility. The focus must be on the material facts relating to consent and the complainant's conduct immediately after the alleged rape. (4) Evidence of immediate complaint and distressed demeanor can be material in assessing the credibility of a rape complainant's version. (5) Where an accused's version contains fatal internal contradictions or implausibilities that render it false beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court is entitled to reject it entirely.
The court observed that there was "a strong suspicion that this new evidence is a fraudulent fabrication" regarding the alleged recanting affidavit, though it stated "it is not necessary to make a finding in this regard" as the application failed on other grounds. This comment, while not binding, signals judicial concern about attempts to use potentially fabricated recanting evidence to overturn rape convictions. The court also noted the procedural history of the matter before the High Court, including the unusual "rescission" application before the Full Court, though it did not have the reasons for the orders issued by Moloi J and the Full Court. The Full Court appeared to dismiss that application primarily on the basis that the appellant sought to introduce a civil law remedy in criminal proceedings, though this was merely noted rather than endorsed by the SCA.
This case is significant in South African criminal law and procedure as it: (1) reaffirms and applies the strict test for admitting further evidence on appeal as established in S v de Jager, emphasizing that such power is exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances to ensure finality in cases; (2) demonstrates the approach courts take to alleged recanting evidence, particularly where authenticity is in serious doubt; (3) illustrates the application of the single witness rule in rape cases, showing that credible testimony from a complainant alone can sustain a conviction even where there are minor inconsistencies; (4) reiterates the limited powers of appellate courts to interfere with factual findings of trial courts as set out in S v Francis; (5) provides guidance on assessing credibility in rape cases where the central issue is consent, emphasizing the importance of immediate complaint evidence and conduct after the alleged rape; and (6) demonstrates judicial vigilance against potentially fraudulent attempts to undermine convictions through fabricated recanting evidence.