In June 2003, the respondent, a 15-year-old Grade 9 learner, suffered a blunt force injury to his right eye when a teacher's belt struck him while administering corporal punishment to another learner. The teacher told the respondent it was a "mistake" which the respondent accepted. In January 2006, when the respondent was 18 years and 5 months old (but still a minor under the law at the time), a family friend suggested he had a claim. The respondent consulted the Public Protector's office, where an advocate advised him to bring a civil claim against the Department of Education. The respondent instructed attorneys who sent a notice under the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 to the Minister of Education on 2 February 2006 (incorrectly, as it should have been sent to the MEC). Summons was served on the appellant on 3 December 2008. The appellant raised a special plea for non-compliance with sections 3(1)(a) and 3(2)(a) of the Act. The respondent then sent a notice to the appellant on 7 May 2010 and brought an application for condonation. The High Court (Govindasamy AJ) granted condonation with costs. The appellant appealed.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The condonation granted by the High Court was upheld.
For purposes of section 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 and section 3(3)(a) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Organs of State Act 40 of 2002, a creditor does not have knowledge of the identity of the debtor until the creditor knows or could reasonably have known of the specific debtor's liability. In joint debtor situations, knowledge of one debtor's identity does not constitute knowledge of the other debtor's identity. A minor rural learner cannot reasonably be expected to know that an organ of state employer is jointly liable with an employee tortfeasor without being specifically informed of that fact. Prescription only begins to run from the time when the creditor acquires such knowledge. The standard in section 3(4)(b) of the Act requiring the court to be "satisfied" sets a standard of overall impression made on a court bringing a fair mind to the facts, not proof on a balance of probabilities. In condonation applications under the Act, where an application is opposed, costs should ordinarily follow the result, as such applications concern permission to enforce a right within statutory parameters rather than mere non-observance of court procedure.
The Court noted that the legal statements by the respondent's attorney that minority prevented the running of prescription were incorrect, referencing ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd 1999 (3) SA 924 (SCA) para 15, but found it unnecessary to explore this issue for purposes of the judgment. The Court also noted it was unnecessary for the court below to have investigated the effect of section 17 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (which changed the age of majority to 18 years on 1 July 2007) on the running of prescription. The Court reiterated the long-established principle that "wrongfulness" is an irrelevant consideration when applying section 12(3) of the Prescription Act, citing numerous authorities including Gericke v Sack, Van Staden v Fourie, Truter v Deysel, and others. The Court also noted that insofar as Van Zijl v Hoogenhout [2004] 4 All SA 427 (SCA) might be interpreted as broadening section 12(3), that prospect was removed by the legislature's introduction of section 12(4) dealing specifically with sexual offences.
This case is significant for establishing when a creditor acquires knowledge of the identity of a debtor in joint debtor situations for purposes of prescription and the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Organs of State Act. It clarifies that actual knowledge or knowledge reasonably obtainable is required, and that a minor rural learner cannot be expected to know that an employer (organ of state) is jointly liable with the employee tortfeasor without being informed of that fact. The judgment also establishes the proper approach to costs in condonation applications under the Act (costs should follow the result), distinguishing such applications from ordinary procedural condonation applications. The case demonstrates a protective approach toward vulnerable litigants (minors) who have been let down by their legal advisors, emphasizing that attorney errors should not prejudice such litigants where they themselves have acted bona fide and the merits of their claim are strong.