The appellant was a property development company whose only noteworthy assets were two pieces of immovable property: Erf 541 in Riversdale and Erf 4573 in Stilbaai West. The first respondent, Mr Mouton, held debentures issued by the appellant for development finance. When the appellant failed to redeem the debentures, Mr Mouton obtained default judgment against the appellant in October 2017. After the judgment remained unsatisfied and a nulla bona return resulted from execution against movable property, Mr Mouton obtained a writ of execution in July 2018 for the sale of the appellant's immovable properties by public auction, scheduled for 12 December 2018. On 11 December 2018 (the day before the auction), Mr Mouton received notification that a related company (Meiprops) had launched a liquidation application against the appellant, and shortly thereafter that the appellant had applied to be placed under business rescue. Mr Renier van Rooyen (Snr), a director of the appellant, deposed to affidavits in both the liquidation and business rescue applications on the same day, making contradictory statements about the appellant's financial position. The CIPC appointed Mr Stewart as business rescue practitioner on 13 December 2018, and the liquidation application was withdrawn. The auction proceeded on 12 December 2018 despite the business rescue, with the two properties sold to the second respondent for R135,000 and R3.89 million respectively. The court a quo declared the business rescue resolution invalid and set aside the appointment of the BRP. It also declared the sale in execution valid and authorized transfer to the purchaser. Transfer was subsequently effected. The appellant appealed against the judgment.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, such costs to include those consequent upon the employment of two counsel. The judgment of the Western Cape Division, Cape Town (Sher J) dated 23 July 2019 was upheld.
In terms of section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, when at the hearing of an appeal the issues are of such a nature that the decision sought will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground alone. Where a company's only noteworthy assets have been lawfully sold and transferred to a purchaser pursuant to a valid court order, and the company is no longer under business rescue with no assets left to administer, an appeal seeking to restore the company to business rescue status will have no practical effect and must be dismissed as moot. Courts will not decide issues where there is no longer any live controversy between the parties.
The Court noted, without deciding the point since the appeal was dismissed on mootness grounds, that the court a quo had found that the averments made by Mr van Rooyen in the liquidation and business rescue affidavits were mutually contradictory and that in at least one affidavit he was being mendacious. The court a quo justifiably had harsh words for the conduct of both Mr van Rooyen and Mr Stewart (the BRP), and rightly concluded that the resolution to place the appellant in business rescue was not passed in good faith, had no intention of attaining the objectives of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding business rescue, and was done with a view to frustrate the sale in execution. The Court also noted that the appellant's reliance on Knox N.O. v Mofokeng 2013 (4) SA 46 (GSJ) was misconceived as the facts in that case (which concerned rescission) were totally distinguishable, and significantly, the validity of the sales in execution was not challenged in the court a quo. The Court observed that it was not clear that Mr Stewart even wished to be restored to his position as BRP.
This case reinforces the principle that South African courts will not entertain appeals that have become moot or that will have no practical effect between the parties, in accordance with section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. It emphasizes that courts should not decide issues of merely academic interest. The case is also significant in the context of business rescue proceedings, demonstrating that where a company's only assets have been lawfully sold and transferred pursuant to a valid court order, and the company is no longer under business rescue, an appeal seeking to restore business rescue status will be dismissed as having no practical effect. The case illustrates the court's approach to attempts to use business rescue proceedings improperly to frustrate legitimate execution proceedings, and confirms that where transfer has been completed following a court order authorizing it, such transfer will not be reversed on appeal.