Alexander Gerhard Falk (first appellant) was arrested in Germany in June 2003 on charges of manipulating share prices through intentional misstatements to obtain unlawful gains. In August 2004, the Hamburg Regional Court (Landgericht) issued a restraint order authorizing attachment of assets valued at €31,635,413.34 to secure against forfeiture in case of conviction. German authorities requested assistance in enforcing this order in South Africa. The Director-General: Justice lodged a certified copy with the registrar of the Western Cape High Court, which was registered on 13 September 2004 in terms of section 24 of the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act (ICCMA). In August 2006, Veldhuizen J granted interdicts against Falk and Falk Real Estate SA (Pty) Ltd (FRS, the second appellant) preventing dealings with shares and a bank account containing €5.22 million. In May 2008, the Hamburg Regional Court convicted Falk of conspiracy to attempt fraud, conspiracy to misrepresent the financial position of a corporation, and misstating information in financial statements. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment but the court refused the forfeiture order. Both Falk and Hamburg prosecutors appealed to the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof). The appellants sought to set aside the registration of the foreign restraint order and the interdicts granted by Veldhuizen J. Louw J dismissed their application in the Western Cape High Court.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel and costs occasioned by applications by both sides to place further evidence before the court.
Section 25 of the ICCMA does not convert a foreign restraint order into an order of the South African High Court; it remains a foreign order and not all provisions of Chapter 5 of POCA apply to it. Section 24A of POCA (requiring orders to remain in force pending appeal) does not apply to registered foreign restraint orders - the position is governed by section 26 of the ICCMA. Section 26(10)(b) of POCA does not apply to registered foreign restraint orders because a South African court lacks jurisdiction to rescind a foreign court's order. A South African court can only vary or rescind the seizure order or ancillary orders it made under section 26(8) of POCA. The definitive grounds for setting aside registration of a foreign restraint order are set out in section 26 of the ICCMA. The phrase 'the court convicting the defendant' in section 17(b) of POCA is not limited to the court of first instance; it includes appellate courts, and proceedings are not concluded while an appeal by the NDPP against refusal of a confiscation order is pending or possible. Ancillary orders under section 26(8) of POCA can properly extend to entities holding the defendant's assets where necessary to preserve the value of those assets.
The Court noted that the fact that section 24(3)(b) of the ICCMA contemplates a prescribed period for applying to set aside registration should not be interpreted as preventing applications after that period if based on facts or circumstances arising after the period - provisions of section 26(1)(e) and (d) militate against such an interpretation and must remain available. The Court observed that where an appeal is pending or could be noted in a foreign court against grant or refusal of a confiscation order, a South African court hearing an application to set aside registration under section 26 of the ICCMA might well postpone the hearing under subsection (2) until the fate of the appeal in the foreign court becomes known. The Court also made general observations about the purpose of restraint orders being to preserve property pending the possible making of a confiscation order, which informed its rejection of interpretations that would undermine this purpose.
This case is significant in South African law for clarifying the relationship between the ICCMA and POCA regarding foreign restraint orders. It establishes important principles about the effect and status of registered foreign restraint orders in South Africa's legal system. The judgment confirms that registration under section 25 of the ICCMA does not convert a foreign order into a domestic order, but rather gives it effect as if it were such an order while maintaining its foreign character. This has important implications for which provisions of POCA apply to foreign restraint orders. The case provides authoritative guidance on the remedies available to persons subject to registered foreign restraint orders, clarifying that section 26 of the ICCMA provides the definitive grounds for setting aside registration, rather than the provisions of POCA governing domestic restraint orders. The judgment is also important for its interpretation of when criminal proceedings are 'concluded' for purposes of asset forfeiture, rejecting a narrow interpretation that would undermine the purpose of restraint orders by excluding appeals by the prosecuting authority. This supports effective international co-operation in criminal matters and asset recovery.