The applicants (Miga Boerdery (Pty) Limited and Jacobus Prins) sought to evict the first and second respondents (Jan Polka and Gertruida Polka) and all persons residing with them from Hermitage Farm, Worcester. The Magistrates' Court per Acting Magistrate Dyani granted an eviction order, finding it just and equitable. However, both the Municipality (fourth respondent) and the Department of Agriculture, Rural Development and Land Reform (fifth respondent) confirmed that no alternative accommodation was available for the respondents. The Municipality indicated that emergency options (non-serviced sites in informal areas and rental units) were not available, with rental units potentially becoming available only within two years. The Municipality's report mentioned a secondary medium to long-term solution at Rholihalhla informal settlement and that it provides emergency housing kits to evictees. The matter came before the Land Court on automatic review in terms of section 19(3) of ESTA.
The Order of the Magistrates' Court was confirmed in part with modifications: (1) The eviction application was granted; (2) Breede Valley Municipality was directed to provide emergency housing suitable for human habitation as close as possible to Hermitage Farm, Worcester; (3) If the respondents are relocated to an informal settlement with no structures, the Municipality must provide temporary emergency housing kits by no later than 31 March 2026; (4) The first to third respondents must vacate the premises on or before 30 April 2026; (5) No order as to costs.
An eviction order under ESTA that will lead to homelessness cannot be just and equitable unless provision is made for alternative or temporary accommodation. Courts may not grant unenforceable orders directing municipalities to provide alternative accommodation without first establishing what accommodation is actually available. When granting eviction orders, courts must include specific safeguards ensuring that: (1) alternative accommodation is suitable for human habitation; (2) relocation is as close as possible to the original location to minimize disruption to employment, schooling, and access to amenities; (3) the dignity of evictees is protected; and (4) the municipality is given reasonable time to provide such accommodation. Where a municipality has emergency housing options available (such as housing kits for informal settlements), these must be specifically addressed in the eviction order rather than issuing general directives for alternative accommodation.
The Court observed that there appeared to be insufficient engagement between the applicants, respondents, and the Municipality regarding alternative accommodation, despite the matter being postponed for over two years for meaningful engagement. The probation officer's report appeared to have been delivered in ignorance of the Municipality's report and did not adequately engage with it. The Court noted that the Municipality's claim that it had no alternative accommodation seemed contrary to its own admission that it provides emergency housing kits to evictees as part of its resettlement package. The Court commented that it is difficult to understand how the disruptive effects of eviction can be minimized when evictees do not know where they will be relocated, whether they can access their places of employment, or whether their children will need to change schools.
This judgment clarifies the requirements for just and equitable eviction orders under ESTA, particularly regarding alternative accommodation. It reinforces that courts may not grant unenforceable orders and that eviction orders must include specific, practical directions for alternative accommodation rather than general directives to municipalities. The judgment emphasizes the need to consider the dignity, employment, schooling, and welfare of evictees when determining suitable alternative accommodation. It applies and develops Constitutional Court jurisprudence on housing rights in the context of farm evictions, requiring courts to ensure that evictions are minimally disruptive to occupiers' way of life. The case also clarifies that emergency housing kits and informal settlement options may constitute available alternative accommodation that must be considered and specified in eviction orders.