Mr Bernert, a motor mechanic who designed and built a vehicle called the 'El Macho', sought financing to build a production plant. Through intermediaries (Mr Fanjek and Mr Dinawi), he met Sheikh Fawaz Bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa, who agreed to invest millions of dollars in manufacturing plants across five continents. The precondition for this investment was that Bernert obtain a specific document from a reputable South African bank. Through Mr Fanjek and Mr Els (an insurance broker employed by Absa Brokers), and with the signature of Mr Coetzee (an Absa Bank business manager), a document on Absa Bank letterhead was produced and addressed to Emirates Bank International. The document purported to provide assurances about accepting a US$6 million fixed deposit. When Absa Bank discovered the existence of this document (which had been signed without proper authority by Mr Coetzee), it took steps to retrieve it and wrote to Emirates Bank on 30 May 2000 stating that the document was issued by an unauthorized person in irregular circumstances and should be disregarded. Sheikh Fawaz subsequently withdrew from the investment project. Bernert sued Absa Bank, claiming that the bank's letter to Emirates Bank was wrongful and caused him to lose anticipated profits of R187 million from the manufacturing venture. The High Court found in favor of Bernert, declaring Absa Bank liable for damages.
The appeal was upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel where employed. The order of the High Court was set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the claim with costs.
1. A bank is entitled and obliged to advise third parties that a document bearing its letterhead was issued without authority and in irregular circumstances when that document, read as a whole, is capable of misleading third parties, regardless of what meaning the parties to the transaction might have attributed to it. 2. An employee has no authority to issue documents on behalf of a bank that constitute gibberish with the potential to mislead, and the issuing of such documents does not fall within the regular business of a bank. 3. Liability in delict for negligent misstatement requires that the misstatement be made to and relied upon by the plaintiff. No such liability arises where the allegedly false statement is made to a third party and not relied upon by the plaintiff. 4. When separating issues under Rule 33(4), a court must make a clear order defining precisely what issues are to be determined, particularly where causation is a contested element of the claim. The terminology of "merits" and "quantum" may create uncertainty where causation is in dispute. 5. Causation in claims for loss of future business profits must be established by proper evidence, not speculation. The mere existence of a business plan is insufficient to establish that the anticipated profits would probably have been realized.
1. Nugent JA observed that the concept of "financial mist" - the use of fictitious documents loaded with financial terminology emanating from major financial institutions - is commonly used by those engaging in financial scams to blind targets to what is truly occurring and to gauge the level of financial sophistication of the target. 2. The Court noted with some irony that Mr Bernert's statement that "in life you take things at face value" appeared to have influenced the trial court's approach, whereas a more skeptical evaluation was warranted. 3. The Court observed that had Absa Bank done nothing to ensure the document did not remain in circulation once it knew of its existence, "its failure would have been nothing short of reckless." 4. The Court noted there were "many curious features of this case that were left unexplained and there are many gaps in the narrative" because "much of the trial was taken up with arguments between counsel and witnesses on the meaning of documents and little interest was shown in establishing all the facts." 5. The Court remarked that Mr Bernert, while apparently honest and not complicit in anything untoward, "was a novice in the financial world" with "little knowledge of the nature and structure of corporations or of financial transactions in general." 6. Nugent JA expressed surprise that the claim was brought at all, stating: "In my view this claim ought to have failed at every step. I find it surprising that it was brought at all." 7. The Court warned that courts must apply their minds to whether it is convenient to separate issues and must express the questions to be determined "with clarity and precision" in their separation orders. 8. The Court reiterated previous warnings against being "seduced by the appearance of a witness at the expense of analysing what the witness has to say."
This case is significant in South African law for several reasons: 1. It clarifies that a bank has both the right and the duty to warn third parties when documents bearing its letterhead have been issued without proper authority, particularly when such documents are capable of misleading. 2. It illustrates the concept of "financial mist" - the use of complex financial terminology and fictitious documents to create confusion and facilitate scams. 3. It confirms that liability for negligent misstatement requires that the statement be made to and relied upon by the plaintiff - it cannot arise where the statement is made to a third party. 4. It emphasizes the importance of courts properly structuring separation of issues under Rule 33(4), with clear orders defining what is to be determined at each stage. 5. It reinforces that causation must be established with proper evidence, not speculation, particularly in claims for loss of future business opportunities. 6. It warns against courts being seduced by the appearance or demeanor of witnesses rather than analyzing the substance and coherence of their testimony. 7. It establishes that banks cannot be held liable for taking reasonable steps to protect the integrity of their documentation and prevent fraud or misrepresentation.