The deceased, Mr Tebogo Patrick Olesitse, was a police officer stationed at Mafikeng Police Station vehicle identification section. In May 2008, he was arrested without a warrant and detained on charges of theft and corruption following an investigation into the theft and disappearance of motor vehicle parts and accessories. He was detained from 19 May 2008 to 29 May 2008 when he was released on bail. On 17 May 2011, the Director of Public Prosecutions declined to prosecute and the charges were formally withdrawn. Nine days later, on 26 May 2011, the deceased instituted a first action against the Minister of Police for damages arising from unlawful arrest and detention, claiming R400,000. In October 2012, Murphy J partially upheld a special plea on prescription, dismissing the claim for damages sustained prior to 26 May 2008. On 11 May 2016, Baqwa J awarded the deceased R90,000 in damages for unlawful detention. While the first action was still pending, on 12 December 2012, the deceased instituted a second action for damages for malicious prosecution arising from the same events. After the deceased's death, his wife, Ms Mmabasotho Christinah Olesitse, as executrix of his estate, continued the second action. The Minister raised a point of law that the second claim was a duplication of the first claim and offended the "once and for all" rule.
1. The appeal against the dismissal of the application for condonation for the late filing of the application for leave to appeal is upheld with no order as to costs. 2. The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following: (a) Condonation for the late filing of the application for leave to appeal is granted; (b) Leave to appeal is granted. 3. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Where a plaintiff has a single cause of action or multiple causes of action arising from the same event or set of facts, and possesses all the facts necessary to formulate all claims at the time of instituting the first action, the 'once and for all' rule requires that all claims for damages be instituted in one action. A subsequent action based on the same facts constitutes a duplication of actions and is legally incompetent, even if the subsequent claim is based on a technically different cause of action (such as malicious prosecution as opposed to unlawful arrest and detention). The rule is part of South African common law and is grounded in public policy considerations including preventing multiplicity of actions, preventing harassment of defendants, avoiding conflicting decisions, and ensuring finality in litigation. The rule operates closely with the principles of res judicata and lis alibi pendens.
The Court observed that the high court had correctly noted that the lawfulness of an arrest may be irrelevant when dealing with malicious prosecution, and that while there are differences between claims for malicious prosecution and unlawful arrest and detention, 'that difference pales into insignificance having regard to the fact that the event that gave rise to the deceased's claims is the same.' The Court also noted that in exercising discretion on condonation applications, courts should consider: the degree of non-compliance with the rules; the explanation for non-compliance; the importance of the case to the applicant; the respondent's interest in finality; the convenience of the court; and the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice. The Court expressed sympathy for the difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown regulations on legal practices, noting that the National State of Disaster had caused 'major disruption within many attorney firms.'
This case affirms and applies the important common law principle of the 'once and for all' rule in South African delictual claims. It clarifies that where multiple causes of action (such as unlawful arrest and detention, and malicious prosecution) arise from the same event or set of facts, and the plaintiff has knowledge of all the facts necessary to formulate all claims at the time of instituting the first action, all claims must be brought in a single action. The judgment prevents plaintiffs from strategically splitting claims arising from the same incident into multiple actions, thereby promoting judicial economy, preventing harassment of defendants through multiple proceedings, avoiding the risk of conflicting judgments, and ensuring finality in litigation. The case demonstrates the court's application of the principles established in Custom Credit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Shembe and Evins v Shield Insurance, and reaffirms that the rule is grounded in public policy considerations requiring an end to litigation.