The applicant and the first to fourth respondents are owners or have interests in properties on Augustus Close, Mt Pleasant, Harare. A dispute arose when the applicant decided to construct a boarding house for student accommodation at stand 531 Mt Pleasant (5 Augustus Close). On 11 August 2023, the first to fourth respondents obtained a provisional order (HCH4608/23) ordering the applicant and fifth respondent to terminate all building operations and commercial activities at the property. The provisional order was served on the applicant on 22 August 2023, giving it ten days to oppose confirmation. The applicant did not file opposition within the prescribed time. On 6 September 2023, the applicant's erstwhile legal practitioners (Tavenhave and Machingauta) noted an appeal which was dismissed on 6 November 2023. On 11 January 2024, opposing papers (deposed to on 30 November 2023) were belatedly filed. On 13 March 2024, the legal practitioners withdrew the opposing papers and renounced agency. The applicant discovered the withdrawal on 26 March 2024 when its representative visited the High Court. The applicant filed a first condonation application (HCH1944/24) on 26 April 2024, which was struck off by DEME J for not seeking upliftment of the bar or reinstatement of withdrawn pleadings. The applicant then filed the present composite application on 25 November 2024, seeking condonation, upliftment of bar, and reinstatement of withdrawn pleadings.
1. The application is granted. 2. The applicant's failure to timeously file its notice of opposition and heads of argument to the confirmation of the provisional order under HCH4608/23 is condoned. 3. The automatic bar in operation against the applicant in respect of HCH4608/23 is uplifted. 4. The applicant's notice of opposition and heads of argument to the confirmation of the provisional order granted under HCH4608/23, withdrawn on 13 March 2024, are reinstated into the court record. 5. Each party to bear its own costs.
1. Under Practice Direction 3 of 2013 and established jurisprudence (Bindura Municipality v Magogo, Chinganga v Shava), where an application is struck off the roll for being fatally defective due to non-compliance with court rules, it is a nullity that cannot be reinstated. The appropriate remedy is to file a fresh application seeking condonation and extension of time within which to comply with the relevant rules. 2. Courts may adjudicate composite applications for condonation, upliftment of bar, and reinstatement where the considerations are virtually identical and such procedure promotes expedition (Read v Gardner). 3. In determining condonation applications, courts must cumulatively consider: extent of delay, reasonableness of explanation, prospects of success, bona fides, prejudice to the other party, need for finality, and the interests of justice (Dzvetero v Sakunda Trading, Mzite v Damafalls). 4. A litigant seeking condonation cannot escape the results of their legal practitioner's lack of diligence (Kombayi v Berkhout), but where the client acted promptly upon discovering the default and has provided a reasonable explanation accounting for the delay, courts may exercise discretion to grant relief. 5. Where the relief originally sought has been rendered moot by subsequent events (such as the granting of a permit after a provisional order questioning the application for that permit), the applicant may have prospects of success in defending confirmation of the provisional order (applying principles from Khupe v Parliament and Movement for Democratic Change v Mashavira).
The court noted it would have been prudent for the erstwhile legal practitioners to depose to an affidavit admitting fault and explaining what transpired, but acknowledged the practical difficulty where the relationship had soured. The court observed that the applicant's failure to report the legal practitioners' conduct to the Law Society of Zimbabwe was curious but did not affect the outcome. The court commented that preliminary objections about urgency and self-created delays have been blown out of proportion in recent practice, noting that litigants do not exist solely to file court processes and reasonable delays should be accommodated (citing Telecel Zim v POTRAZ and Prosecutor-General v Busangabanye). The court observed that while mootness does not constitute an absolute bar to justiciability, courts retain discretion to hear moot issues where significant or requiring authoritative determination in the interests of justice. The court noted there is no legal basis for dismissing a matter simply because taxed costs are under review, though courts have inherent jurisdiction to stay vexatious or frivolous proceedings (Stanbic Bank v CSBBVERA Logistics). The court emphasized that the ultimate aim is to achieve justice between parties and enable real disputes to be definitively ventilated, which may override the principle of finality in litigation in appropriate circumstances.
This case is significant for clarifying the proper procedure when an application is struck off as fatally defective under Practice Direction 3 of 2013. It confirms that such applications are nullities that cannot be reinstated, and the correct remedy is to file a fresh application with condonation and extension of time. The judgment provides important guidance on composite applications for condonation, upliftment of bar, and reinstatement of withdrawn pleadings, reaffirming that courts will consider the cumulative factors of delay, explanation, prospects of success, bona fides, and prejudice. It demonstrates the court's willingness to exercise discretion in favor of substantive justice where delay is explained and genuine prospects of success exist, particularly when the alternative would prevent ventilation of the real dispute between parties. The case also applies principles of mootness in the context of administrative applications where subsequent events may render the original relief sought without practical effect.