Augustine Mbalekelwa Tanaye Dube and Motoring Accidents Life Consultants (Private) Limited v The Law Society of Zimbabwe

The first appellant was the managing director of the second appellant, a company that assisted victims of road traffic accidents to claim from insurance companies. Neither the first appellant nor the other director was a registered legal practitioner. The company's objects included advising and assisting victims of road traffic accidents to claim from insurance companies and to institute action for compensation where appropriate. Following complaints from several insurance companies, the Law Society of Zimbabwe formed the opinion that the first appellant, in conducting the business of the second appellant, was in breach of s 9(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act. The Law Society sought an interdict from the High Court to prevent the appellants from communicating with insurance companies and/or their legal representatives in connection with accident damages claims on behalf of members of the public. The High Court examined correspondence written by the first appellant on behalf of the second appellant which offered to assist claimants "for or in expectation of a fee or commission" and contained language suggesting that unless claims were compromised, legal proceedings would follow. The High Court granted the interdict, finding that the appellants were contravening s 9(2)(b) of the Act by threatening to sue out a summons or process in a court of civil jurisdiction in consideration of payment of a fee or commission.

• Whether the correspondence from the appellants constituted a 'threat' to sue out a summons or process within the meaning of s 9(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act
• Whether the correspondence disclosed that the summons or process would be issued by the appellants themselves rather than by registered legal practitioners
• Whether the appellants were in breach of s 9(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act by assisting persons to threaten to sue out a summons or process in consideration of a fee or commission
• Whether the costs order made by the High Court should be altered

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Under s 9(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 'threaten' means "an intimation by one to another that unless the latter does or does not do something the former will do something which the latter will not like"; (2) Whether correspondence constitutes a threat to sue out a summons or process must be determined objectively by what was written, not by the unexpressed mental reservations or unstated intent of the writer; (3) The test is what an ordinary reasonable reader would understand from the correspondence at face value; (4) Where correspondence from an unregistered person or entity dealing with claims for a fee gives recipients the alternative of out-of-court settlement or court action, without mentioning the involvement of lawyers, and makes it clear that the matter is solely between that person/entity and the addressee, the reasonable inference is that the unregistered person/entity itself will sue out the requisite summons or process; (5) Such conduct constitutes a breach of s 9(2)(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act; (6) The situation is analogous to quasi-mutual consent where parties are bound by the objective meaning of their communications.

The Court made obiter observations regarding costs, noting that: (1) the Supreme Court will only interfere with the exercise of a judicial discretion on costs upon well-established grounds; and (2) a notice of appeal must cover any contention sought to be advanced on appeal. The Court also noted in passing that the first appellant had stated in a newspaper interview that "when the case has been won ... the claimant is required to pay a commission to the company", though this was not central to the legal reasoning.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean (and by extension South African) jurisprudence as it clarifies the scope and application of provisions prohibiting unregistered persons from carrying on legal practice. It establishes that: (1) persons and companies offering litigation assistance services for a fee must not create the impression that they themselves will institute legal proceedings; (2) the test for whether correspondence constitutes a 'threat' to sue is objective, based on what a reasonable reader would understand from the words used; (3) unexpressed mental reservations or unstated intentions cannot be relied upon to avoid statutory prohibitions on unauthorized legal practice; and (4) the absence of express mention of who will institute proceedings does not assist where the reasonable inference from the correspondence is that the unregistered person/entity will do so. The case reinforces the regulatory framework protecting the legal profession and the public from unauthorized legal practice.