Assistant Inspector Mazura Lloyd and Others v The Officer Commanding District and Others

Five police officers (applicants) were alleged to have solicited bribes from motorists carrying imported goods from South Africa at roadblocks. They were arrested and immediately suspended from duty in terms of section 47 of the Police Act Chapter 11:16. The officers opted to be tried by a magistrate in terms of section 32 of the Act. They were acquitted on one count and prosecution was declined on two other counts in February 2016. The 1st respondent then summoned them to appear before him to answer disciplinary charges under the Police Act for the same conduct. The applicants challenged this in HC 458/16 and obtained an order prohibiting their prosecution under the Police Act. They subsequently filed the current application seeking a declaratory order that their suspensions were unlawful and wrongful, arguing that the reason for their suspension had fallen away following their acquittal and the court order preventing further prosecution.

• Whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant a declaratory order under section 14 of the High Court Act
• Whether the applicants' suspension under section 47 of the Police Act became unlawful following their acquittal on criminal charges
• Whether the Commissioner General's power to suspend pending a board of inquiry survived the applicants' acquittal on criminal charges
• Whether criminal acquittal bars subsequent disciplinary proceedings
• The relationship between criminal proceedings and civil/disciplinary proceedings under section 278 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act

The application for a declaratory order was dismissed with costs.

1. A conviction or acquittal in criminal proceedings does not bar civil or disciplinary proceedings in relation to the same conduct (applying section 278 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act). 2. Section 47 of the Police Act authorizes suspension not only pending criminal trial but also pending a board of inquiry under section 50, and these are distinct processes. 3. A declaratory order under section 14 of the High Court Act will not be granted where it would unjustifiably prevent a statutory authority from exercising lawful powers conferred by legislation. 4. The appropriate remedy for challenging the lawfulness of a suspension based on procedural irregularities or undue delay is review proceedings, not declaratory relief.

The court noted at the outset that prior to November 2017, there was a mushrooming of police roadblocks whose purpose was not always legitimate, resulting in outcry by motorists, providing context for the case. The court also observed that while applicants claimed suspension letters were not properly authenticated within 24 hours as required by Standing Orders, they failed to produce the actual suspension letters as evidence. The court suggested that if the Commissioner General took an inordinate delay in finalizing investigations, the decision to suspend could be taken on review on that basis.

This case clarifies the important distinction between criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings in the context of police officers in Zimbabwe. It confirms that an acquittal on criminal charges does not automatically invalidate a suspension or prevent disciplinary proceedings relating to the same conduct. The judgment reinforces the Commissioner General's broad disciplinary powers under the Police Act, particularly the power to convene boards of inquiry to assess suitability to remain in the force irrespective of criminal proceedings outcomes. It also illustrates the limits of declaratory relief under section 14 of the High Court Act, emphasizing that such relief will not be granted where it would improperly interfere with statutory powers, and that review proceedings are the more appropriate remedy for challenging administrative decisions.