Ashton Kasirori v Commissioner General of Police and Others

The applicant, a police officer, was charged and convicted on 10 January 2012 of contravening paragraph 3 of the Schedule to the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] for "Acting in an unbecoming manner or in any manner prejudicial to good order or discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit to the police force." He was convicted again on the same section in an unrelated incident on 3 December 2012. The applicant alleged he was never given the record of proceedings in both instances. After his appeal to the first respondent was unsuccessful, he served the sentences imposed. The applicant took no action for approximately two years until 10 January 2014, when he was served with a notice to appear before a suitability board in terms of Section 50 of the Police Act to determine his suitability to remain in the police force. Upon receiving this notice, the applicant simultaneously launched three applications: an application for review (HC 47/14), an application for condonation of the late filing (HC 44/14), and this urgent chamber application seeking to interdict the suitability board hearing scheduled for 13 January 2014.

• Whether the application was urgent within the meaning of the court rules
• Whether an applicant who delays for two years before taking action can rely on urgency when the day of reckoning arrives
• The proper test for urgency in urgent chamber applications

The urgent chamber application was dismissed with costs.

Urgency in the context of urgent applications is not established merely by the imminent arrival of a deadline or day of reckoning. A matter is urgent only if, at the time the need to act arises, the matter cannot wait. Urgency that stems from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline approaches is not the type of urgency contemplated by the court rules. Where an applicant has had substantial time (in this case, two years and one year respectively) to take action but fails to do so, and only seeks urgent relief when faced with imminent consequences, the application will not be considered urgent and will be dismissed.

The court observed that from the applicant's own conduct it was clear that he did nothing about his situation from 10 January 2012 (two years prior) until when he was summoned to appear before the board of officers. The court noted that the applicant appeared in person while the respondents were represented by counsel from the Attorney General's Office. The court also noted that the applicant had simultaneously launched three separate applications (review, condonation, and urgent interdict) only after receiving the notice to appear before the suitability board, suggesting these applications were reactive rather than based on genuine urgency.

This case reinforces the principle in Zimbabwean law (which shares common law principles with South African law) that self-created urgency arising from an applicant's own delay and inaction does not constitute the type of urgency required for urgent relief. The case serves as authority for the proposition that courts will not grant urgent relief to applicants who sleep on their rights for extended periods and only seek urgent intervention when faced with the consequences of their inaction. It emphasizes that the certificate of urgency or supporting affidavit must always contain an explanation for non-timeous action where there has been delay. This principle is consistent with South African jurisprudence on urgent applications and the requirements for demonstrating true urgency.