The respondent was employed by the applicant and occupied house number 1131, Chipadze Township, Bindura. On 1 December 2003, the applicant entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with employees to dispose of housing units to sitting tenants. On 12 December 2003, the applicant and respondent entered into an 'Agreement of Lease' for a 60-month period with monthly rentals of Z$20,000, with an option to purchase after 60 months. The respondent's payslips reflected deductions labeled 'rent to buy', and on 14 March 2004, the applicant acknowledged receipt of Z$1,100,000 toward the house purchase with an outstanding balance of Z$60,000. The respondent was dismissed on 15 July 2009 after 67 months of occupation. The applicant then sought to evict the respondent, claiming the lease had terminated upon dismissal. The respondent defended, claiming he had exercised the option to purchase and fully paid for the house, and filed a counterclaim seeking transfer of title.
The application for summary judgment was dismissed with costs.
A defendant resists summary judgment by disclosing a defense and material facts with sufficient clarity and completeness to show a bona fide defense. Where a defendant presents documentary evidence (payslips showing 'rent to buy' deductions, acknowledgments of payment toward purchase price, occupation beyond the lease period) that raises an arguable case that an option to purchase was exercised and a sale agreement was concluded, summary judgment for eviction will not be granted. The doctrine of stare decisis binds lower courts to Supreme Court decisions on points of law, but not to factual findings—courts may distinguish cases on their facts and arrive at different conclusions where the factual matrix differs.
The court observed that the applicant had not meaningfully explained why, after 60 months of occupation and in view of documentary evidence of payments described as part of the purchase price, it still maintained that the respondent had not purchased the house. The court noted that several other judges had dealt with similar matters involving the same applicant and its employees, reaching varying conclusions based on the particular facts of each case, suggesting a pattern of disputes arising from the applicant's housing disposal scheme. The court emphasized that it would be 'unfair and improper' at the summary judgment stage to deny the defendant the opportunity to defend the claim where an arguable case exists.
This case is significant in South African and Zimbabwean civil procedure as it demonstrates the proper application of summary judgment principles and the high threshold applicants must meet. It illustrates that where material factual disputes exist regarding contractual interpretation and performance—particularly in 'rent to buy' arrangements—courts will not grant summary judgment but will allow matters to proceed to trial. The case also demonstrates the principle that Supreme Court precedents bind lower courts on points of law but not on factual determinations, allowing judges to reach different conclusions on different facts. The judgment contributes to jurisprudence on employee housing schemes and the interpretation of hybrid lease-purchase agreements, showing judicial reluctance to grant summary eviction where there is documentary evidence supporting a claim of purchase.