In 1998, the applicant mining company proposed to sell its housing units to employees as part of a staff retention scheme over a five-year period, as the mine's lifespan was projected to be around five years. After deliberations involving a housing committee with employee representatives and consultations with lawyers, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed stating that Ashanti would dispose of its housing units to sitting tenant employees effective 1 December 2003. On 12 December 2003, the respondent (a former employee) entered into what was headed 'Agreement of Lease' for five years with monthly payments not exceeding 25% of basic salary. The agreement provided for revaluation based on salary increments. Deductions on the respondent's payslip were titled 'Rent to Buy'. The applicant accepted lump sum payment in full and final settlement before the purported lease period expired. After the respondent's employment terminated, the applicant sought to evict him on the basis that he was a mere tenant whose employment had ended. The respondent contended that the applicant had sold the house to him.
The application for summary judgment was dismissed. The respondent was given unconditional leave to defend the action. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application.
To successfully oppose summary judgment, a defendant need only satisfy the court that: (1) he has fully disclosed the nature and grounds of his defence and the material facts upon which it is founded; and (2) on the facts so disclosed, he appears to have a defence which is bona fide and good in law. A defendant succeeds in having summary judgment dismissed if there is a mere possibility of success, a plausible defence, a triable issue, or a reasonable possibility that an injustice may be done if summary judgment is granted. Where an agreement's true characterization (as lease or sale) is disputed and supported by evidence including contemporaneous documents, minutes showing sales negotiations, payment designations as 'rent to buy', and acceptance of lump sum settlements, a triable issue exists that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
The court made strong obiter remarks criticizing the applicant's litigation conduct, noting that it was engaged in 'judge-hunting' by bringing multiple similar cases before different judges despite having lost on the same issues in previous cases. MUTEMA J stated it was 'only prudent and proper' that the applicant should await the outcome of the pending appeal in the Bonde case (HH 139-09) and 'stop judge-hunting in order to avoid creating a multiplicity of contradictory judgments involving the same issue thereby causing confusion and injustice.' The judge noted there were 'scores of similar cases involving the applicant and its former employees' and that 'several similar cases are either pending before other judges or have been dealt with meeting with the same fate of dismissal.' These comments reflect judicial concern about abuse of process and forum shopping.
This case illustrates the application of summary judgment principles in Zimbabwe (which closely follow South African jurisprudence) in the context of employment-related housing disputes. It demonstrates how courts will refuse summary judgment where documentary evidence and the parties' conduct support competing characterizations of an agreement (lease versus sale). The judgment is significant for its criticism of litigant abuse of process through 'judge-hunting' - bringing multiple similar applications before different judges to seek favorable outcomes while appeals are pending. It also demonstrates judicial consistency in applying precedent to materially similar facts.