In 1983, the plaintiff and his brother purchased Stand No. 6357, Glen View, Harare from Hosiah Chiradza, who had previously purchased it from Caleb Mutyenyoka (the deceased). The plaintiff and his brother developed the stand and constructed a house from 1983 to 1986, paid occupation charges to the City of Harare from 1985, and signed an agreement of sale in November 1986. The deceased remained the registered owner. In August 2000, the deceased was located and agreed to effect transfer for ZW$50,000, which was paid in three instalments to him and, after his death in January 2001, to his widow. The widow refused to effect cession. In December 2002, the Master appointed the 2nd defendant as executor dative and authorized cession into the names of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. In January 2003, the plaintiff instituted a claim for cession (HC 743/03). In March 2003, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants sold the property to the 9th defendant, which was reversed. In August 2003, they sold it to the 1st defendant, who obtained a default judgment for cession and ejectment in November 2003 (HC 8050/03). The plaintiff then instituted an urgent application for stay of execution, rescission of default judgment, and cession (HC 10752/03). All three cases were consolidated.
1. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants ordered to cede Stand No. 6357, Glen View 3, Harare to the plaintiff and his brother Abisha Ndidzano jointly, failing which the Deputy Sheriff is authorized to sign requisite papers to effect cession. 2. The City of Harare directed to register the cession into the joint names of the plaintiff and his brother. 3. The judgment and order of 5 November 2003 in Case No. HC 8050/03 rescinded. 4. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants ordered to pay costs jointly and severally on a legal practitioner-client scale.
In cases of double sales of immovable property, where the second purchaser has notice or knowledge of a prior sale at the time of the second sale or when taking transfer, the first purchaser is entitled to recover the property from the second purchaser, in the absence of special circumstances affecting the balance of equities. The second purchaser is bound by the rights of the first purchaser, and it constitutes a species of fraud if the second purchaser attempts to defeat those rights. Such fraud does not require proof of intention to frustrate the first purchaser's rights; the mere fact that the second purchaser is aware of existing rights and nevertheless continues to enforce their own rights, thereby defeating or infringing the earlier rights, is sufficient. Property sold before the death of the registered owner does not form part of the deceased estate for distribution purposes, even if the deceased remained the registered owner at death. Punitive costs on a legal practitioner-client scale are appropriate where parties have acted mala fide, manipulated court process, and given false evidence.
The Court noted that while it would have been preferable for the plaintiff's brother to have been joined as co-plaintiff or for the plaintiff to have obtained written authority to sue, verbal authority combined with explanations of mutual intention to purchase jointly and non-availability of the brother at the time proceedings were instituted was sufficient to establish locus standi in the circumstances. The Court also observed that the 2nd defendant's evidence regarding having lived at the house as a young child was patently false given that building plans were only approved in November 1983, after his alleged period of residence. The judgment comments on the 2nd defendant having "woven a veritable tapestry of falsehoods on the witness stand," indicating judicial disapproval of parties who deliberately mislead the court.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean property law for its comprehensive application of the principles governing double sales of immovable property. It establishes that where a second purchaser has knowledge or notice of a prior sale at the time of purchase or when taking transfer, the first purchaser is entitled to recover the property. The case emphasizes that a second purchaser's awareness of existing rights and continuing to enforce their own rights constitutes a species of fraud, without requiring proof of intention to frustrate the first purchaser's rights. It also demonstrates the court's willingness to grant punitive costs where parties have acted in bad faith, manipulated court process, and given false evidence. The judgment reinforces the protection of prior purchasers' rights even where formal registration has not occurred, particularly where the first purchaser has exercised continuous possession and developed the property.