Anna-Mercy Munangatire v Noreen Chikaka (In her capacity as executrix of the estate late Samuel Zachary Dick Munangatire) and Grace Nyandoro and The Master of the High Court N.O

Anna-Mercy Munangatire (applicant) married Samuel Zachary Dick Munangatire in 1970 in the UK under civil marriage laws. In 1989, after relocating to Zimbabwe, they acquired an immovable property at 36 Marlborough Drive, Harare, registered in Samuel's name, which became their matrimonial home. In the 1990s, Samuel commenced an adulterous relationship with the 2nd respondent (Grace Nyandoro), resulting in children. In 1996, applicant instituted divorce proceedings citing the adultery, claiming inter alia distribution of the matrimonial home. In 1998, applicant returned to the UK for work, followed later by the children, leaving Samuel alone. The 2nd respondent then moved into the matrimonial home with Samuel. Around 2001, both Samuel and the 2nd respondent relocated to the UK, where they jointly acquired a house. Samuel died on 12 November 2012 while residing in the UK, separated from both women. The 1st respondent was appointed Executrix Dative. In her distribution account, she sought to award the Marlborough property to all beneficiaries after allowing the 2nd respondent's claims for improvements (USD 37,000) and maintenance for children (USD 38,444), leaving the applicant with only about USD 2,993 from a property valued at USD 120,000. Applicant sought a declaratory order that the Marlborough property was her matrimonial home and should devolve to her as surviving spouse under sections 3 and 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act.

• Whether the applicant, as surviving spouse, was entitled to inherit the matrimonial home under section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act despite not living in the property immediately before the deceased's death
• The proper interpretation of 'lived immediately before the person's death' in section 3A(a) of the Deceased Estates Succession Act
• Whether the applicant's absence from Zimbabwe for economic reasons constituted temporary absence that would not disqualify her from inheriting under section 3A
• Whether the 2nd respondent's claims for improvements and maintenance were properly substantiated and should be allowed
• Whether the executrix should be removed for bias or improper administration
• Whether the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies before approaching the court

The application was dismissed with each party to bear their own costs. The court held that the applicant was not entitled to sole inheritance of the Marlborough property under section 3A, but remained entitled to the deceased's household goods and effects and to a child's share in the immovable property.

For a surviving spouse to inherit the matrimonial home under section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02], two requirements must be satisfied: (1) the person must be the surviving spouse of the deceased, and (2) the person must have lived in the house immediately before the deceased's death. The phrase 'lived immediately before the person's death' must be interpreted in the context of the specific facts of each case. A spouse who has been absent from the matrimonial property for an extended period (in this case since 1998 until death in 2012), who filed for divorce, lived separately from the deceased, and established a separate life elsewhere, cannot be said to have 'lived' in the property immediately before death, even if the absence was ostensibly for economic reasons. The protection afforded by section 3A is intended to prevent surviving spouses from being uprooted from their domestic premises, not to automatically grant ownership of all matrimonial property regardless of the actual living arrangements at the time of death. Claims for improvements and maintenance in estate administration must be properly substantiated and processed through appropriate statutory procedures rather than simply being accepted and included in distribution accounts.

The court observed that while the legislative intention behind section 3A was to protect widows and minor children against marauding relatives who would plunder matrimonial property, this protection is not absolute and must be balanced against the actual requirements set out in the statute. Had the legislature intended that surviving spouses should inherit houses acquired during marriage purely on the basis of being the only asset, irrespective of whether they lived there at death, it would have stated so clearly. The requirement of 'lived immediately before the person's death' serves a purpose beyond merely identifying which property when multiple properties exist. The court also commented critically on the conduct of the 2nd respondent and her agent (Stanford Management Services) in making exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims that would have virtually deprived the lawful spouse of all benefits from the estate, describing this as exhibiting 'greediness'. The court noted that the Master of the High Court should have provided guidance and made determinations when requested by the applicant, rather than remaining silent and forcing the applicant to approach the court. Each party bearing their own costs was appropriate as the issues raised needed judicial determination for proper estate administration.

This case provides important guidance on the interpretation of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act, particularly the requirement that a surviving spouse must have 'lived immediately before the person's death' in the matrimonial home to qualify for automatic inheritance. The judgment clarifies that the legislative protection for surviving spouses, while broad in purpose, has specific requirements that must be met. It distinguishes between genuine temporary absences for economic reasons (where marital links are maintained and the spouse intends to return) and situations of de facto separation where parties have established separate lives. The case also provides guidance on the proper administration of estates, particularly regarding the scrutiny required for claims by third parties and the proper procedure for maintenance claims under the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act. It reinforces that executors have a duty to interrogate claims rather than accept them at face value, especially where such claims would substantially deprive lawful beneficiaries of their inheritance.