The applicants were employees of the respondent who were allocated motor vehicles for official and personal use under their employment contracts and the respondent's motor vehicle policy. The policy provided for ownership of vehicles to pass to employees after a four-year cycle. The applicants alleged this cycle elapsed in January 2013 and the respondent's human resources manager, Moses Mawire, transferred ownership of the vehicles to them. The respondent disputed this, claiming the applicants unlawfully obtained the vehicles by taking advantage of chaos at the workplace in January 2013 and pressuring Mawire to transfer ownership. The respondent instituted a vindicatory action under HC 10472/13 to recover the vehicles and filed disciplinary charges against the applicants on 28 March 2014, with hearings set for 3-4 April 2014. The charges related to the irregular transfer of vehicles during the unlawful occupation period. The applicants approached the court on urgent basis on 1-2 April 2014 seeking an interdict to halt the disciplinary proceedings pending finalization of the vindicatory action.
The application for an interdict was granted. The respondent was compelled to halt the disciplinary hearings pending finalization of the vindicatory action in case HC 10472/13.
Where disciplinary proceedings are instituted by an employer mala fides and with vindictiveness, not for genuine disciplinary purposes but to achieve an ulterior objective (such as recovering property that is the subject of separate civil litigation), such proceedings constitute an unfair labour practice and are unlawful. Courts have jurisdiction to interdict such proceedings even though they would normally not interfere in internal disciplinary processes. An employer cannot translate a purely civil dispute into a purported labour dispute to punish employees. Disciplinary charges that are essentially about the same subject matter as pending civil litigation (possession and ownership of property) are not separate and distinct but are interconnected, and courts may stay such disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of the civil action. For an interdict, where a real apprehension of injury is shown and the case is established on a balance of probabilities, the court may grant relief. Loss of employment constitutes irreparable harm.
The court noted that most employer-employee codes of conduct contain standard guidelines and timelines for preferring charges, typically involving an initial investigation followed by recommendations before charges are laid. While the court could not definitively determine whether the respondent followed proper procedure (as the code of conduct was not placed before it), the 14-month delay was highly unusual and suggestive of improper motive. The court also observed that the respondent's argument that applicants had alternative remedies through appeal to the Labour Court and Supreme Court was unrealistic, as dismissed employees would likely lack the financial means to pursue such appeals, meaning those avenues would be effectively closed to them. The court remarked that 'justice does not come cheaply to those who are in search of it.'
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law as it establishes important principles regarding the court's willingness to intervene in employer disciplinary processes where those processes are being used mala fides or as a vehicle to achieve objectives unrelated to genuine workplace discipline. The case demonstrates that courts will look beyond the form of proceedings to their substance and will protect employees from vindictive or bad faith disciplinary action. It reinforces that employers cannot disguise civil disputes as labour matters to circumvent proper legal processes. The judgment also clarifies the test for urgent interdicts in the employment context and affirms that loss of livelihood constitutes irreparable harm justifying interlocutory relief.