Amos Phiri and Others v Namib Minerals and Another

The first to fourth applicants were former employees of Mazowe Mining Company (Pvt) Ltd (second respondent), which was part of Metallon Corporation Limited. Between 2014 and 2017, the second respondent faced severe financial distress and struggled to meet payroll obligations. The applicants claimed the second respondent owed former employees over USD 14 million in unpaid salaries, pensions, and benefits. The second respondent had previously been subject to corporate rescue attempts, with a 2020 High Court order for corporate rescue overturned by the Supreme Court in 2021 due to procedural non-compliance. On September 11, 2025, the applicants discovered that the first respondent (Namib Minerals) had deployed staff and security guards to the mine, with media reports suggesting the first respondent had concluded acquisition of the mine. The applicants brought an urgent chamber application on September 15, 2025, seeking an interdict to stop the acquisition process until their salary debts were paid.

• Whether the urgent chamber application was procedurally valid and properly constituted
• Whether the matter was genuinely urgent
• Whether the court had jurisdiction over the first respondent, a foreign entity
• Whether the applicants had locus standi to challenge corporate transactions of their former employer
• Whether the application was fatally defective due to the interim relief being identical to the final relief sought
• Whether the matter was moot because the acquisition had already been completed

1. The application be and is hereby struck off the roll. 2. The applicants shall pay the respondents costs.

In an urgent chamber application, where the interim relief sought is identical to the final relief, the application is fatally defective and must be struck off the roll. This is because granting interim relief identical to final relief would allow an applicant to obtain final relief on proof merely of a prima facie case, without needing to prove their case fully on the return date, thereby defeating the whole object of interim protection and rendering the return date a legal fiction.

The court noted that even if the first respondent is an "indirect owner" of the second respondent, a company under corporate rescue is protected by a legal moratorium. If the first respondent is allowed to restart gold production while the second respondent is under corporate rescue, the assets of the company might be depleted, rendering the corporate rescue process useless for other creditors. The court observed that once gold is mined and sold, it cannot be recovered. However, the court did not develop this point further as the application was struck off on procedural grounds. The court also did not address the other points in limine raised by the respondents concerning jurisdiction over the foreign first respondent, the applicants' locus standi, or whether the matter was moot.

This case reinforces the important procedural principle in Zimbabwean urgent chamber applications that interim relief must not be identical to final relief. It demonstrates that courts will strictly enforce this requirement and strike off applications that fail to comply, regardless of the substantive merits or urgency of the underlying dispute. The case serves as a reminder to legal practitioners to carefully craft urgent applications to ensure interim relief is temporary and preservative in nature, not substantive or final. It also illustrates the consequences of procedural defects in urgent applications involving labour and corporate law disputes.