The respondent was employed by the appellant as a Packer (Grade II) on fixed-term contracts since 2008. In May 2019, the appellant did not renew the contract. The respondent treated this as unfair labour practice and lodged a complaint. After conciliation failed, a Designated Agent of the National Employment Council determined the matter and on 12 October 2023 issued a ruling ordering the appellant to pay the respondent USD 25,881.84 (US$22,248 in salary arrears and US$3,633.84 in pension contributions). The appellant did not appeal or seek review of this determination, and it became final. The appellant failed to pay the amounts awarded. In January 2024, the respondent sued in the Magistrates' Court claiming payment of the sum awarded by the Designated Agent. The appellant raised a special plea that (1) the Magistrates' Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a labour matter, and (2) the claim was res judicata. The magistrate dismissed the special plea, holding that once the Designated Agent had resolved the dispute, what remained was a debt enforceable like any other civil debt. The appellant appealed to the High Court.
The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Magistrates' Court dismissing the special plea was set aside. In substitution, the appellant's special plea was upheld and the respondent's claim in the Magistrates' Court (Case No. HRE C-CG 39/24) seeking enforcement of the Designated Agent's determination as a civil debt was dismissed as incompetent for want of a lawful enforcement mechanism under the current statutory scheme. No order as to costs in either the court a quo or on appeal, given that the matter raised a genuine and recurring question of public importance arising from a legislative lacuna.
A Designated Agent's determination under the Labour Act, though final and binding within the labour dispute-resolution architecture, cannot be enforced through ordinary civil proceedings in the Magistrates' Court in the absence of an express statutory enforcement mechanism. Where Parliament has expressly provided registration and enforcement procedures for certain labour instruments (Labour Court decisions under s 92B, arbitral awards under s 98, and certificates of settlement under s 93(2)), the absence of a comparable mechanism for Designated Agent determinations represents a structural legislative omission that courts may not remedy by treating such determinations as enforceable civil debts. Section 176 of the Constitution confers inherent powers to regulate process and develop the common law, but does not authorize courts to create new enforcement regimes or to legislate where Parliament has established a detailed statutory scheme and omitted a particular enforcement pathway. Courts must not convert statutory determinations into executable civil judgments by judicial innovation where the Legislature has not provided for such enforceability.
The Court added a policy observation emphasizing that the outcome exposes an urgent legislative gap: determinations by Designated Agents, though final within the labour dispute-resolution architecture, may be practically ineffectual absent explicit enforcement provisions. The Court noted that while courts may identify the lacuna and explain its consequences, amendment is a matter for Parliament, not the judiciary. The Court also observed that the phrase in Nyanga suggesting determinations can form the basis of proceedings 'much the same as liquid documents' must be read in context; Nyanga ultimately declined to craft a remedy by extending inherent jurisdiction and does not stand as authority that determinations are enforceable as civil judgments absent legislation. The Court deliberately refrained from laying down broad doctrine on the status of administrative tribunal determinations for res judicata purposes, noting only that finality of determination is conceptually distinct from enforceability through civil execution processes.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour and constitutional jurisprudence because it: (1) identifies and confirms a critical legislative gap in the enforcement of Designated Agent determinations under the Labour Act, creating a situation where employees may obtain final favourable rulings that are practically unenforceable; (2) clarifies the constitutional limits of inherent jurisdiction under section 176 of the Constitution, holding that courts cannot use inherent powers to create enforcement mechanisms that amount to legislation; (3) reinforces the separation of powers doctrine and principles of statutory interpretation, particularly that courts must not fill statutory gaps that effectively amend legislation; (4) establishes that the express provision of enforcement mechanisms for certain labour instruments (Labour Court decisions, arbitral awards, conciliation settlements) implies the exclusion of unenumerated instruments (Designated Agent determinations); and (5) calls attention to an urgent need for legislative intervention to provide enforcement procedures for Designated Agent determinations, highlighting the tension between finality of determination and enforceability of outcomes.