The applicants (Amaplat Mauritius Limited, Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Limited, and Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation) brought an urgent application seeking interim relief to prevent the first respondent (Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation) from alienating or disposing of mining rights and business interests arising from Memoranda of Understanding concluded on 25 July 2008 and 13 October 2006. The applicants also sought to prevent changes to shareholding in the third and fourth respondents (Zimari Platinum (Private) Limited and Zimari Nickel (Private) Limited) pending arbitration proceedings to be instituted in Paris. When the matter came for hearing on 24 January 2011, the first respondent had only filed opposing papers that morning at 9:00 hours. The parties agreed to postpone the matter sine die to enable the applicants to respond. The applicants then applied for an interim order pending determination of the main matter, which was substantially similar to the relief sought in the main application. The first respondent's counsel undertook to advise his clients not to engage in the complained conduct pending determination.
The application for an interdict pending determination in the main matter was dismissed with costs being costs in the cause. The first respondent was admonished to abide by the advice of its legal practitioner regarding maintenance of the status quo ante pending determination in the main matter.
Where counsel for a respondent undertakes to advise their client (particularly a statutory board) to maintain the status quo and not engage in conduct that would undermine pending court proceedings, a court may refuse to grant a formal interim interdict on the basis that it is wholly unnecessary. The court will rely on the general principle that parties must not obstruct, preempt, undermine or sabotage the outcome of court proceedings, and on the expectation that law-abiding citizens and entities will comply with legal advice given by their practitioners.
Bhunu J made general observations about the law-abiding nature of Zimbabwean citizens and expressed confidence that a statutory board such as the first respondent would not act contrary to the advice of its legal practitioners. The judge also commented on the general rule that parties must desist from conducting themselves in a manner that seeks to obstruct, preempt, undermine or sabotage the outcome of court proceedings. These observations were not strictly necessary for the decision but reflected the court's general approach to such matters and its trust in the integrity of statutory bodies and the legal profession.
This case illustrates the Zimbabwean courts' approach to interim interdicts where an undertaking is given by counsel. It demonstrates judicial reluctance to grant formal interim orders where the conduct sought to be interdicted is already subject to an undertaking by legal practitioners, particularly where the interim relief sought mirrors the main relief. The case also reflects judicial confidence in the legal profession's ability to advise clients appropriately and in the law-abiding nature of statutory boards and citizens generally. It establishes a principle of judicial economy and restraint in not granting unnecessary interim orders where undertakings provide adequate protection.