Albert Mugove Matapo and Others v The State

The applicants were arrested on 30 May 2007 and charged with contravening section 20 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. They were committed for trial on 4 June 2008 and served with indictment papers for trial set for 7 July 2008 before the High Court. The trial did not proceed on that date due to the defence not receiving witnesses' statements and difficulties accessing the applicants to prepare their defence outline. The defence raised a constitutional challenge which was heard by Hlatshwayo J on 5 August 2008, with judgment reserved and later handed down on 18 November 2008. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the application on 7 December 2009. Defence counsel requested the matter be set down during the First Term of 2010, but was advised this was not possible. In March 2010, the matter was set down for trial on 21 June 2010. The applicants had remained in custody throughout this period and applied for dismissal of charges on the basis they were not brought to trial within six months of committal.

• Whether the applicants were brought to trial within six months of committal as required by section 160(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
• How to calculate the six-month period under section 160(2)
• What constitutes 'circumstances beyond the control of the Attorney-General' under the proviso to section 160(2)
• Whether High Court vacation periods should be excluded from the six-month calculation
• Whether the period during which a constitutional challenge was pending constitutes circumstances beyond the Attorney-General's control

The case against the applicants was dismissed.

1. The six-month period under section 160(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act commences immediately upon committal for trial. 2. A 'calendar month' for purposes of calculating the six-month period means the period from any date in one month to the corresponding date in the next month, as defined in section 33(6) of the Interpretation Act. 3. If the aggregate period between committal and trial exceeds six months, even if interrupted by circumstances beyond the Attorney-General's control, the accused is entitled to dismissal of the case. 4. High Court vacation periods do not constitute 'circumstances beyond the control of the Attorney-General' under the proviso to section 160(2). 5. An accused person is 'not available to stand trial' only in circumstances such as serious illness or when the trial process is interrupted by another judicial process like a constitutional referral to the Supreme Court. 6. Delays caused by the prosecution's failure to provide required documents or to set down matters timeously are not circumstances beyond the Attorney-General's control and count toward the six-month period.

The court noted that section 160(2) was enacted to protect accused persons from being unreasonably kept under committal for longer than six months and to ensure the Attorney-General conducts trials expeditiously. There must be a balancing of the interests of society vis-à-vis the interests of the accused person. The court also observed that section 160(2) does not entitle applicants to a discharge or acquittal, nor does it relate to the running of prescription; it merely relates to release from committal. The court expressed dissatisfaction with the State's failure to file an opposing affidavit despite being directed to do so, noting that the State's representative's illness did not absolve the State from its obligations.

This case provides important guidance on the interpretation and application of section 160(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, which protects accused persons from unreasonable delay in being brought to trial after committal. It clarifies how the six-month period should be calculated and what circumstances constitute those 'beyond the control of the Attorney-General.' The judgment emphasizes the constitutional right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time and holds the prosecution to strict compliance with procedural timeframes. It demonstrates the court's willingness to protect accused persons' rights by dismissing cases where the State fails to bring them to trial timeously without adequate justification.