The respondents were shift workers employed by the appellant. During a particular week, they worked the 10:00 pm to 6:00 am shift from Monday until Saturday, 8 November 1997. At the end of their Saturday shift, they received orders to report for work on Sunday for five hours. The respondents regarded this order as unlawful, believing it infringed on their statutory right to one day off per week and contravened previous practice where they were never required to make up hours not worked in a particular week. The respondents disobeyed the order and were summarily dismissed for insubordination or failure to obey a lawful order, in accordance with the appellant's Code of Conduct. Under the Milling Industry Employment Regulations (SI 668/83), shift workers were required to work not more than 45 hours per week. The respondents' eight-hour shifts translated to 40 hours for five days (Monday to Friday). The appellant ordered them to work five additional hours on Sunday to complete their regulated 45-hour working week.
1. The appeal was allowed with costs. 2. The order of the Labour Relations Tribunal was set aside and substituted with: "The appeal is dismissed with costs."
Where employment regulations prescribe maximum working hours per week and require one day off per week without specifying which days must be worked or which day constitutes the rest day, the employer has the discretion to determine the working days and the rest day, provided the total hours worked do not exceed the statutory maximum and employees receive at least one full day off in each week. Wilful disobedience of a lawful order occurs when an employee deliberately refuses to comply with a clearly communicated instruction that does not violate any statutory provision or regulation, regardless of the employee's subjective belief about the lawfulness of the order. A misdirection by a tribunal as to material facts constitutes a misdirection in law where it is reasonably probable that the tribunal would not have reached the same determination had there been no such misdirection.
The Court observed that the employer's past practice of not requiring employees to work on Sundays for fifteen years did not create a binding right or prevent the employer from lawfully requiring Sunday work within the regulatory framework. The Court also noted that merely because a practice has existed for a considerable period does not mean that an order departing from such practice is unlawful or amounts to introducing a new condition of work, especially where the order merely seeks to fulfill an existing regulated condition of work. The judgment implicitly suggests that employees who are uncertain about the lawfulness of an order should seek clarification or raise a grievance rather than unilaterally deciding to disobey the instruction.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law jurisprudence as it clarifies the interpretation of working hour regulations under collective bargaining agreements and the extent of employer discretion in scheduling work within regulatory parameters. It establishes that where regulations specify maximum working hours per week and a minimum rest period (one day off per week) without prescribing specific days of work, employers have discretion to schedule working days and rest days. The case also affirms the principle that factual misdirections by lower tribunals can constitute misdirections in law justifying appellate intervention. Furthermore, it confirms that employees' subjective belief that an order is unlawful does not excuse wilful disobedience where the order is objectively lawful, and that such disobedience can justify summary dismissal. The judgment reinforces management prerogative in organizing work schedules within the confines of applicable employment regulations.