The appellant was a building contractor responsible for constructing the Drakensberg Sun Hotel for the first respondent (owner) and second respondent (lessee/operator). The design required a fireplace with a Jetmaster firebox, a railway sleeper (impregnated with bitumen) as a mantlepiece resting on top of the firebox, and decorative chipboard with log ends above. During winter 1988, a fire originating in the lobby fireplace destroyed part of the hotel. The fireplace construction did not comply with Jetmaster's installation instructions (which required combustible materials to be at least 450mm above the firebox or properly insulated) or the National Building Regulations. The heat from constant use caused the railway sleeper to ignite, and fire spread through a false flue created between the chipboard and masonry into the roof void. The respondents sued the contractor, architect, interior decorator, and project manager in delict for negligence. Claims against other defendants were settled or withdrawn.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel. The finding of the court a quo (Malan J) holding the appellant liable to compensate the respondents for damages was upheld. The quantum of damages remained to be determined as it had been separated from the liability issue.
A building contractor owes a legal duty in delict to both the building owner and third parties to refrain from constructing structures which are manifestly unsafe. This duty exists regardless of whether the contractor is following an architect's design, particularly where: (1) the contractor possesses expert knowledge that the structure is manifestly unsafe; (2) the contractor fails to comply with manufacturer's safety instructions; and (3) the building contract itself requires compliance with such instructions and notification to the architect of any conflicts. Contractual obligations to follow architectural plans do not eliminate delictual liability for constructing manifestly unsafe structures. The test for wrongfulness involves a value judgment based on reasonableness, morality, policy and the legal convictions of the community - foreseeability of harm is a relevant consideration. A contractual exemption clause protecting a contractor from liability for design defects does not apply where the contractor has itself been negligent and failed to comply with its contractual obligations; such clauses protect only contractors who have fully complied with their contractual duties.
The court stated (obiter) that it is improbable that any building contract would contain a term (tacit or otherwise) requiring a builder to build something which is manifestly unsafe or defective. The court also observed that conduct which is lawful towards one person may be unlawful towards another, emphasizing the relational nature of delictual duties. Harms JA noted approvingly that the record in this case was one of the few that justified commendation for being properly prepared, trimmed of unnecessary material, and duly cross-referenced - departing from the usual lament about the state of court records. The court accepted for purposes of argument (without deciding) that a building owner might not be able to hold a builder liable in delict if the builder were contractually required to construct an unsafe structure, though expressed doubt about whether such a contractual term would exist.
This case is significant in South African delictual and construction law for establishing that building contractors owe a duty of care in delict not only to building owners but also to third parties (such as lessees/operators) to refrain from constructing manifestly unsafe structures. It clarifies that contractual obligations to follow an architect's design do not absolve contractors of delictual liability when they construct something manifestly unsafe, particularly where the building contract itself requires compliance with manufacturer's safety instructions and notification of conflicts. The case reinforces that professional expertise carries corresponding legal responsibilities, and that contractual exemption clauses will be interpreted narrowly and will not protect parties who have themselves been negligent or failed to comply with their contractual duties. It is an important precedent on the intersection of contractual and delictual liability in construction contexts.