On 3 September 1999, Vuzumuzi Herry Bongolo (the deceased) was walking along Pretoria Street in Hillbrow, Johannesburg with friends when he was fatally shot. Two friends (State witnesses) identified the appellant as the perpetrator. The appellant was arrested that evening. He pleaded not guilty to murder, admitting he fired three shots into the ground but denying he shot the deceased. The post mortem showed the deceased was shot from the front through the mouth, with the bullet exiting the back of the neck. The State witnesses testified the deceased was shot in the back of the head. The appellant was out on bail during the trial and most appeal proceedings. On 31 May 2006, the appellant was convicted after a protracted trial. On 20 November 2006, he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and granted leave to appeal against conviction. The appeal to the South Gauteng High Court was heard on 1 December 2010 (four years later) and dismissed. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was only finally heard on 11 March 2019, a total of 13 years after sentencing. Due to administrative errors during the delay, the appellant's bail was estreated and he spent 15 months in prison (June 2015 to September 2016) before being released when the SCA granted special leave to appeal.
The appeal was upheld. The order of the South Gauteng High Court was set aside and replaced with an order upholding the appeal and setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial extends to appeal proceedings and requires reasonable expedition; (2) Where there are material misdirections by a trial court, including flawed credibility findings affected by unacceptable delays, an appellate court is at large to disregard those findings and come to its own conclusion on whether guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt; (3) The State bears the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and must adduce sufficient evidence, including ballistic evidence where the source of a gunshot is disputed, to discharge that onus; (4) Where State witnesses' evidence contains material contradictions, improbabilities and fabrications, and is unsupported by objective evidence that should have been available, such evidence is unreliable and insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (5) Lengthy delays between the completion of evidence and delivery of judgment materially affect a trial court's ability to make reliable credibility findings.
The court made several important obiter observations: (1) The inordinate delay in this case (13 years from sentencing to final appeal) may well have rendered the process unconstitutional, though no definitive finding was made as neither party raised it; (2) Trial magistrates should not insist on securing transcripts when they have taken adequate notes during trial, as this causes unacceptable delays; (3) Trial magistrates must avoid unduly interrupting proceedings and speaking for long periods, as this contributes to delay and may create an impression of entering the arena; (4) Administrative errors leading to wrongful arrest and imprisonment (as occurred here when the appellant spent 15 months in prison due to bail being estreated) are particularly egregious consequences of systemic delays; (5) The courts expressed the view that "justice delayed is justice denied" and emphasized that this adage operates with even greater force in South Africa's constitutional dispensation; (6) The court noted that an objective observer must come away from proceedings with a clear feeling that the accused had a fair trial, which will not occur if proceedings are unduly protracted.
This case is significant for several reasons: (1) It reinforces that the constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial extends to appeal proceedings and that justice delayed is justice denied; (2) It condemns systemic delays in the criminal justice system and holds the State accountable for ensuring trials and appeals are dealt with expeditiously; (3) It demonstrates that lengthy delays between evidence and judgment can fatally undermine the reliability of credibility findings; (4) It emphasizes the State's burden to secure critical evidence (particularly ballistic evidence in firearm cases) and that failure to do so can be fatal to the prosecution; (5) It reaffirms that appellate courts will interfere with credibility findings where there are material misdirections by the trial court; (6) It illustrates the proper application of the reasonable doubt standard where State witnesses' evidence contains material contradictions and improbabilities; (7) It highlights the dangers of perfunctory judgments that fail to grapple with material inconsistencies in the evidence.