On 16 November 2007, Owens entered into an instalment sale agreement with FirstRand Bank to purchase a Honda vehicle, to be paid over 78 months. She took possession of the vehicle but defaulted on payments. On 17 February 2010, Owens applied for debt review under s 86(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. No debt review process was completed and she remained in default for over a year. On 19 July 2011, FirstRand gave notice in terms of s 86(10) of the Act to Owens, the debt counsellor and the National Credit Regulator, terminating the debt review. FirstRand then instituted action on 11 August 2011 for return of the vehicle and costs. Owens gave notice to defend. FirstRand applied for summary judgment on 7 September 2011. The high court (Legodi J) refused to grant summary judgment on the basis that FirstRand had not given the requisite notice under s 129(1)(a) of the Act. FirstRand appealed with leave of the high court.
The appeal was upheld with costs. The decision of the high court was set aside. The matter was remitted to the North Gauteng High Court to determine whether summary judgment should be granted against the respondent, with the clarification that the court may not require any further notice under s 129(1) to be given by FirstRand.
Where a credit provider terminates a debt review in respect of a particular credit agreement through a notice given in terms of s 86(10) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, it may proceed to enforce the agreement under ss 129 and 130 of the Act without serving a further notice under s 129(1)(a) of the Act. The notices contemplated in s 129(1)(a) and s 86(10) are alternative requirements, not cumulative. Section 129(1)(b)(i) makes clear that legal proceedings cannot commence before providing notice 'as contemplated in paragraph (a), or in section 86(10), as the case may be'. A s 129(1)(a) notice applies where there has been no debt review; a s 86(10) notice applies where the consumer has already applied for debt review. The reference to s 86(9) in s 130(1)(a) should be read as s 86(10).
Lewis JA observed (agreeing with Cameron J in Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC)) that while the National Credit Act was intended to be 'significantly consumer-friendly and court-avoidant', its provisions in fact lead to considerable confusion and widely-different interpretations by parties, legal representatives and courts, resulting in an unfortunate proliferation of litigation. The court noted that Legodi J chose to differ from a decision of Murphy J in the same high court and to disregard the careful analysis of pertinent sections by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2011 (4) SA 508 (SCA). The court expressed its indebtedness to Mr C D Pienaar of the Free State Bar who represented the unrepresented respondent pro bono at the request of the court.
This case provides crucial clarification on the notice requirements under the National Credit Act before a credit provider can enforce a credit agreement. It establishes the proper interaction between ss 86(10), 129 and 130 of the Act, confirming that these provisions created alternative (not cumulative) notice requirements depending on whether debt review proceedings had been initiated. The judgment addresses the confusion and proliferation of litigation arising from differing interpretations of these consumer-friendly but complex provisions. It also corrects an apparent drafting error in s 130(1)(a) by reading the reference to s 86(9) as s 86(10). The case has been relied upon extensively in subsequent credit law litigation and forms part of the jurisprudence interpreting the debt enforcement procedures under the National Credit Act.