On 30 September 1995, the Estate of the late Marjorie Diana Dent (represented by the respondent executor) concluded a written agreement to sell certain mineral rights in farm Duitschland 95 to the appellant for R1,792,269.64. The agreement required the appellant to furnish a bank guarantee as security for payment. Due to uncertainty regarding heirs, there was delay in obtaining the Master's consent. An addendum was concluded on 14 December 2001 amending clause 3.1 to provide that the appellant would furnish a bank guarantee within 14 days from written notice that the Master had issued consent under section 42(2) of the Administration of Estates Act. The Master issued consent on 21 April 2004, and the appellant was notified on 22 April 2004. The appellant failed to respond or furnish the guarantee by the deadline of 6 May 2004. Critically, on 1 May 2004, section 3(1)(m) of the Deeds Registries Act was repealed, making registration of cessions of mineral rights impossible. The respondent instituted proceedings for payment of the purchase price. The appellant defended on the basis that the repeal rendered performance superveningly impossible and the agreement lapsed.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel. The judgment of the high court (Bam AJ) in favor of the respondent was upheld.
A sale becomes perfecta once there is agreement on the merx and pretium and any suspensive condition has been fulfilled. Upon a sale becoming perfecta, the benefit and risk pass to the purchaser. A stipulation requiring a purchaser to furnish a bank guarantee for payment of the purchase price within a specified time after fulfillment of a condition is an enforceable contractual term, not a suspensive condition. The distinction is that a contractual obligation can be enforced by action, whereas no action will lie to compel performance of a condition. Where a sale has become perfecta, the risk of supervening impossibility of delivery (including impossibility caused by legislative repeal of the means of registration) falls on the purchaser, and the seller remains entitled to payment of the purchase price. Discretionary powers in contracts (such as approval of guarantees) must be exercised arbitrio boni viri (reasonably).
The court expressed disagreement with a dictum in Ingledew v Theodosiou 2006 (5) SA 462 (W) at para 52, where Willis J suggested that a clause requiring furnishing of a bank guarantee within 30 days 'could be interpreted as a condition precedent or a suspensive condition'. Mpati P stated he could find no reason why such a clause would prevent a seller from enforcing performance by the purchaser, and to the extent the dictum suggested the clause contained a suspensive condition, he disagreed. The court noted that while the appellant indicated in heads of argument an intention to argue whether the coming into effect of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 and the Mining Titles Registration Amendment Act resulted in supervening impossibility discharging the agreement, this second issue was not argued and did not arise given the finding that the sale was perfecta.
This case is significant in South African contract and sale law for clarifying the crucial distinction between suspensive conditions and contractual terms in sale agreements. It establishes important principles regarding when a sale becomes perfecta and when risk passes to a purchaser. The judgment reaffirms the principle that in a perfecta sale, the risk of loss or destruction of the object of sale passes to the purchaser even if delivery has not yet occurred. This includes the risk of supervening impossibility of performance caused by legislative change. The case provides guidance on interpreting clauses requiring security for payment, clarifying that such requirements are typically enforceable contractual obligations rather than suspensive conditions. The decision also reinforces that discretionary powers given to parties in contracts must be exercised reasonably (arbitrio boni viri). The case has practical importance for transactions involving mineral rights and for understanding the consequences of legislative changes affecting the ability to perform contractual obligations, particularly in the context of the transition from the old mineral rights regime to the new regime under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act.