The court observed that there is no reason in principle why a court cannot relax the 'same person' requirement for the very reasons why the other two requirements (same cause and same relief) have been relaxed over time. Citing Wallis JA in Caesarstone, the court noted it may be that the requirement of 'same person' is not confined to cases of identity of persons or privity in the strict sense, stating: 'Subject to the person concerned having had a fair opportunity to participate in the initial litigation, where the relevant issue was litigated and decided, there seems to me to be something odd in permitting that person to demand that the issue be litigated all over again with the same witnesses and the same evidence in the hope of a different outcome, merely because there is some difference in the identity of the other litigating party.' However, the court emphasized that for such development of the common law to occur, persuasive reasons must be placed before the court, considering fairness, equity, and whether refusing the defense would defeat the purpose of preventing multiplicity of litigation and conflicting judicial decisions.