The City of Cape Town applied for environmental authorisation to establish a regional landfill site at one of two shortlisted sites: Atlantis or Kalbaskraal. Both sites underwent environmental impact assessment as alternatives. The Director (exercising delegated powers from the MEC) granted authorisation for the Atlantis site in July 2007. 348 appeals were lodged. The MEC upheld the appeals and in April 2009 granted authorisation for Kalbaskraal instead (the first decision). This decision was reviewed and set aside on procedural fairness grounds. After a supplementary EIA and public participation process, the MEC again upheld the appeals in August 2013 and granted authorisation for Kalbaskraal (the second decision). The appellants were commercial poultry farmers and a farming association near Kalbaskraal with concerns about groundwater contamination and disease vectors. They successfully reviewed the second decision, which was remitted to the MEC. A reserved question was separated for determination: whether the MEC, when dealing with appeals against a decision granting authorisation for Atlantis, could authorise activities at Kalbaskraal instead.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The high court's determination that the MEC could, when determining appeals against authorisation for the Atlantis site, grant authorisation for the Kalbaskraal site instead, was upheld.
An appeal under sections 35(3) and (4) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 against a decision by an officer exercising delegated authority on an application for environmental authorisation under section 22 involves a complete rehearing and fresh determination of the merits of the application with or without additional evidence or information. The appellate decision-maker is empowered to substitute his or her own decision for the decision under appeal and to exercise the full decision-making powers conferred by section 22(3). The power under section 35(4) to 'make such order as he may deem fit' is not limited to confirming, setting aside or varying the first-instance decision but includes the power to substitute an entirely different decision that the first-instance decision-maker could have made. The term 'alternative proposed activities' in sections 22(2) and (3) of the ECA includes the same activity proposed at different alternative locations, not only different types of activities at the same location.
The Court noted contextually that it is permissible to read section 22(2) of the ECA as permitting comparative assessment of proposed and alternative proposed sites in circumstances where there are no available alternatives to the proposed activities. The Court acknowledged the comprehensive supplementary EIA and public participation process undertaken after the first decision was set aside, which ensured updated specialist input and further comment by interested and affected parties. The Court distinguished the case from municipal tender cases (like Groenewald) where practical considerations necessitate limiting the scope of appeals to avoid administrative nightmares and unreasonable delays - challenges absent in environmental authorisation appeals. The judgment emphasized that the specific context of section 35 appeals is that the first-instance decision-maker was exercising powers delegated by the appellate decision-maker, which justifies the broad appellate powers.
This case authoritatively establishes the scope of appeal powers under section 35 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. It confirms that appeals to the MEC under section 35 are appeals in the wide sense involving a complete rehearing, not limited review. The decision clarifies that 'alternative proposed activities' for environmental authorisation purposes includes the same activity at different locations, not only different activities at the same location. This has significant implications for environmental decision-making and appeals in South Africa. The judgment reinforces that appeal authorities under the ECA have broad powers to substitute decisions, not merely vary them, provided they conduct a proper fresh consideration of the application. It distinguishes the wider appeal powers under environmental legislation from more limited appeal powers in other statutory contexts such as municipal procurement and pension fund adjudication.