On 30 March 2017, President Jacob Zuma announced a Cabinet reshuffle, dismissing Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan and his Deputy Mcebisi Jonas, replacing them with Malusi Gigaba and Sfiso Buthelezi. Four days later, the Democratic Alliance launched an urgent review application in the Gauteng High Court to set aside the President's decision as unlawful, unconstitutional and invalid, primarily on grounds of irrationality, proceeding in terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court. When the President failed to file the record and reasons for the decision within the prescribed timeframes, the Democratic Alliance brought an interlocutory application to compel compliance. The High Court granted the order directing the President to deliver the record and reasons. The President appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. While the appeal was pending, President Zuma resigned and was replaced by President Ramaphosa, who removed Gigaba and Buthelezi from the Finance Portfolio and appointed Gordhan to Public Enterprises. The parties subsequently withdrew the review application by agreement. The Supreme Court of Appeal enquired whether the appeal should still proceed given mootness, and ultimately dismissed the appeal on grounds of mootness, holding that defining the ambit of rule 53 fell within the terrain of the Rules Board.
1. Leave to appeal is granted. 2. The appeal is dismissed. 3. The President of the Republic of South Africa is ordered to pay costs of this application, including the costs of two counsel.
It is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal against an interlocutory order where: (1) the main application underlying the interlocutory order has been withdrawn by agreement; (2) the order has become moot and has no practical effect between the parties; (3) determining the legal issues raised would require traversing the merits of the withdrawn main application; (4) the political and constitutional dimensions of the issues have not been properly ventilated; and (5) the court would effectively be providing an advisory opinion. The mootness of an appeal, combined with its interlocutory nature and the withdrawal of the underlying proceedings, creates a compelling basis for declining to exercise discretion to entertain the matter, notwithstanding requests for guidance on future cases. Courts should be reluctant to expend scarce judicial resources on academic disputes and should preserve complex constitutional questions involving the separation of powers for determination in future cases with proper factual foundations.
Mogoeng CJ observed that the footnote reference to Rule 53 in OUTA should not be read as definitively resolving whether Rule 53 applies to all executive decisions, as that issue was not debated or decided in that case. The Chief Justice noted that there is a "yawning gap" between executive decisions about policy matters (like e-tolls in OUTA) and constitutionally-ordained political decisions like Cabinet appointments. The Court would benefit from "thorough-going and discrete engagement" on whether legality or Rule 53 applies to sections 91(2) and 93(1) decisions before concluding they are reviewable. The statement that executive decisions are reviewable under legality or Rule 53 should be understood as an assumption rather than settled law in the context of Cabinet appointments/dismissals. Jafta J's dissent contains important obiter on statutory interpretation, emphasizing that facts play no role in interpretation and that fidelity to statutory language is paramount. His analysis suggests that Rule 53, properly construed by reference to its language and historical context, does not cover presidential decisions to appoint or dismiss Ministers because: (1) the President is not an "inferior court, tribunal, board or officer"; (2) appointing/dismissing Ministers is not a "judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative function"; and (3) at the time Rule 53 was adopted, prerogative powers like Cabinet appointments were beyond judicial review. Jafta J also noted that PAJA does not specify that High Court reviews must proceed under Rule 53, suggesting Rule 53 serves only as a stopgap pending special rules under section 7 of PAJA.
This case is significant for its treatment of mootness doctrine in South African constitutional law, particularly in the context of interlocutory orders and executive decisions. The majority judgment reinforces the principle that courts will generally not entertain appeals against interlocutory orders, especially where the underlying dispute has been resolved and would require advisory opinions on unventilated issues. The dissenting judgment provides important obiter on the scope of Rule 53, suggesting that it does not apply to presidential decisions to appoint or dismiss Cabinet Ministers as these are not decisions of "inferior courts, tribunals, boards or officers performing judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The case highlights tensions between judicial review of executive action and the separation of powers, particularly regarding politically-charged constitutional powers. It also demonstrates the Court's concern for judicial economy and reluctance to expend scarce judicial resources on academic disputes. The case leaves unresolved the question of whether and how presidential Cabinet appointments and dismissals may be reviewed, preserving this issue for future determination in appropriate proceedings with proper factual foundations.
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