Erf 377 Constantia was subdivided into a sectional title scheme by Alphen Farm Estate (second appellant) comprising a historic precinct (sections 1-2) and a residential precinct (sections 3-19). Twenty respondents owned the 17 residential units. Prior to subdivision, MTN (first appellant) and Vodacom installed 2G cellular antennae on the Mill Range building in the historic precinct pursuant to lease agreements with Alphen. In October 2012, one historic precinct trustee obtained consent from residential precinct trustees to upgrade the installation from 2G to 3G. The upgraded antenna (a fake chimney approximately 5 metres high) was erected in November 2013. In December 2013, the City of Cape Town issued a notice stating the installation breached building regulations as no prior approval had been obtained. In February 2014, residential precinct trustees withdrew their consent. MTN applied for consent use to the City, but the application was incomplete as it lacked authorization from all sectional title owners (required as the installation was on common property). In August 2014, the residential precinct owners applied to the High Court for removal of the installation. Vodacom subsequently settled and agreed to remove its equipment. The application proceeded against MTN and Alphen.
The appeal was upheld with costs including those consequent upon the employment of two counsel. The order of the Western Cape Division was set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the application with costs, such costs to include those of two counsel.
Where a matter falls within section 36(6) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (matters in respect of which a body corporate has capacity to sue), individual sectional title unit owners do not have locus standi to institute proceedings in their own names regarding common property. They must first comply with the procedure set out in section 41(1) by: (a) serving written notice on the body corporate calling on it to institute proceedings within one month; and (b) if the body corporate fails to do so, applying to court for appointment of a curator ad litem for the body corporate to investigate and, if appropriate, institute proceedings on behalf of the body corporate. This statutory procedure applies even where there is dysfunction or deadlock within the body corporate. A matter concerning the lawfulness of infrastructure installed on common property falls within section 36(6)(c) and/or (d) as it concerns matters in connection with the land or building for which the body corporate or owners are jointly liable, and/or matters arising from the body corporate's duties to comply with notices from authorities, ensure compliance with laws relating to common property, and manage common property for the benefit of all owners.
The court made several observations beyond the strict ratio: (1) Section 41 is an important component of the overall structural scheme of the Sectional Titles Act, filtering out unmeritorious claims by over-zealous individuals while ensuring individuals with legitimate complaints have the advantage of the information and funds of the body corporate. (2) The body corporate is "little more than the aggregation of all the individual owners. Their good is its good. Their ill is its ill." (3) Section 41 finds application "precisely when there is disharmony and disunity in the body corporate. The more dysfunctional the body corporate, the greater, I dare say, the need for a curator." (4) A curator ad litem appointed under section 41 would obtain proper advice and properly investigate the facts before taking legal steps, and must report to the court before proceeding, with the court able to issue such directions as seem meet. (5) The court noted that sectional title ownership creates an entirely new composite res (a unit consisting of a section and undivided share in common property) and a new form of composite ownership (separate ownership of a section coupled with joint ownership of common property). (6) Unlike conventional owners, sectional title owners are burdened by the provisions of the Act, the rules and the resolutions of the body corporate.
This case is significant for clarifying the procedural requirements and locus standi of individual sectional title unit owners seeking to litigate matters affecting common property. It establishes that section 41 of the Sectional Titles Act creates a comprehensive statutory scheme that must be followed: individual owners cannot bypass the body corporate and institute proceedings directly in their own names regarding matters falling within section 36(6). The judgment reinforces the principle that the body corporate, as the representative of all owners collectively, is the proper party to sue regarding common property matters. It provides important guidance on when section 41 applies and confirms that dysfunction or deadlock within the body corporate does not excuse compliance with the statutory procedure. The case demonstrates the application of company law principles (particularly the rule in Foss v Harbottle) to sectional title schemes, treating the body corporate as analogous to a company and individual owners as analogous to shareholders who cannot sue for wrongs done to the company. The judgment also clarifies the jurisdictional prerequisites under section 41(1) and the discretionary considerations under section 41(3) for appointment of a curator ad litem. Although the Sectional Titles Act has been substantially amended by the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011, the principles remain applicable as similar provisions appear in the new legislation.