Jurnic Properties Close Corporation and Another v Victor Khanye Local Municipality and Others

The applicants (Jurnic Properties CC and July Motors CC) operated a filling station and related businesses. In 2020, they became aware that Dalamay Properties (Pty) Ltd planned to establish a competing filling station approximately 95 meters from their businesses on municipal property. The Victor Khanye Local Municipality had sold the property to Mr Omar for R1 million (significantly below its alleged R27 million municipal valuation) on 13 December 2018, who then sold it to Dalamay. The property was registered in Dalamay's name on 10 April 2019. The municipality subsequently approved rezoning of the property from 'Agricultural' to 'Mixed Land Use' (application submitted 3 December 2020, published 4 December 2020), and the Mpumalanga Department granted environmental authority for the filling station. The applicants contended they were not properly notified and had no opportunity to object. On 9 June 2021, the applicants launched a review application under s 6(2) of PAJA to set aside: (a) the sale of the property; (b) the rezoning decision; and (c) the environmental authority. The municipality failed to provide adequate reasons for its decisions or a proper rule 53 record. The high court dismissed the application based on preliminary objections, finding the applicants lacked locus standi and had unreasonably delayed instituting proceedings.

• Whether the applicants had locus standi (legal standing) under s 38 of the Constitution to institute review proceedings challenging administrative decisions affecting their business interests
• Whether the applicants' own-interest standing was established by demonstrating a direct and substantial interest in the impugned decisions
• Whether the applicants unreasonably delayed instituting review proceedings under s 7(1) of PAJA
• When the 180-day limitation period under s 7(1) of PAJA commences: upon knowledge of the administrative action alone, or upon knowledge of both the action and the reasons for it
• Whether condonation for unreasonable delay is required when proceedings are instituted within the 180-day period but allegedly with unreasonable delay

1. The high court's decision refusing leave to appeal against its order of 28 March 2024 was set aside. 2. The applicants were granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 3. The appeal was upheld with costs including costs of two counsel where so employed. 4. The high court's order dismissing the review application was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the preliminary objections (points in limine) raised by the third and fourth respondents, with costs including costs of two counsel where so employed. 5. The matter was remitted to the Mpumalanga Division of the High Court, Middelburg, for consideration of the merits of the review application.

1. Own-interest legal standing under s 38 of the Constitution requires demonstration of a direct and substantial interest in the challenged decision, but this should be interpreted broadly and generously in accordance with constitutional objectives. The interest must be real (not hypothetical or academic) and serve the interests of justice. Business operators who can demonstrate concrete adverse effects on their commercial interests from administrative decisions (such as quantified loss of market share from a competing proximate business) have the requisite standing. 2. The 180-day limitation period in s 7(1) of PAJA commences only when a person becomes aware of (or reasonably should have become aware of) both the administrative action and the reasons for it. Knowledge of the action alone is insufficient to trigger the limitation period. 3. When assessing whether there has been unreasonable delay in instituting review proceedings within the 180-day period, courts must consider whether the applicant acted reasonably in the circumstances, including time reasonably required to ascertain the facts and obtain information about the decision from an obstructive or non-responsive decision-maker. Steps taken to establish facts before launching proceedings do not necessarily constitute unreasonable delay.

The Court noted (para 44) that it was unnecessary to address the high court's obiter remarks regarding alleged anti-competitive behavior by the applicants or the failure to exhaust internal remedies, as these issues were not pursued on appeal by any party. The Court's statement implies these findings by the high court were inappropriate and not supported by the evidence. The judgment also contains observations about the importance of public interest considerations in standing determinations, particularly regarding municipal compliance with procurement legislation and constitutional obligations of transparency and fairness (paras 24, 31). While these considerations supported the finding of standing, the broader observations about their role in standing analysis may be considered obiter. The Court noted (para 25) that the sale at a price significantly below municipal valuation (R1 million vs alleged R27 million) raised public interest concerns warranting judicial scrutiny, though this was not strictly necessary for the standing determination.

This judgment provides important clarification on two critical aspects of administrative law review proceedings in South Africa: (1) Legal standing (locus standi): The judgment reinforces that own-interest standing under s 38 of the Constitution is broader and more generous than traditional common law standing. It confirms that business operators have standing to challenge administrative decisions that directly affect their commercial interests, particularly where the impact is concrete and quantifiable (such as proven loss of market share). The Court emphasized that standing should be assessed generously and that public interest considerations (such as ensuring municipal compliance with procurement laws and constitutional obligations) are relevant when assessing own-interest standing. (2) Limitation periods under PAJA: The judgment authoritatively clarifies that the 180-day limitation period in s 7(1) of PAJA commences only when an affected person becomes aware of both the administrative action and the reasons for it. Knowledge of the action alone is insufficient. This places an obligation on administrative decision-makers to provide reasons and protects applicants from being time-barred while attempting to obtain information about decisions affecting them. The judgment also addresses the relationship between the 180-day period and the broader requirement not to delay unreasonably, confirming that steps taken to ascertain facts before launching proceedings do not constitute unreasonable delay. The case is significant for municipal law, emphasizing the importance of transparent procurement processes and proper compliance with notification requirements in land use and environmental applications.