The case involved the eviction of 71 unlawful occupiers (waste pickers) from Portion 971 of the Farm Randjesfontein No 405 in Midrand, owned by Rycloff-Beleggings (Pty) Ltd. The occupiers lived in shacks on the property and earned their living by collecting recyclable materials from nearby industrial sites using flat-bed trolleys, sorting and storing the materials on the property, and selling them to recycling companies. This was their sole source of income, and they lived with their families, including children and households headed by women. Rycloff sought their eviction to facilitate a development valued at over R456 million on an adjoining property. The City of Johannesburg identified Erf 128 Kya Sands as suitable temporary emergency accommodation but imposed a condition that the occupiers could not conduct waste picking activities there. The high court granted the eviction order but directed the City to provide temporary emergency accommodation where the occupiers could continue their waste picking activities.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including costs of two counsel where employed. Paragraph 2(b) of the high court's order was amended to direct the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality to provide temporary emergency accommodation for the first to seventy-first occupiers within 60 days of the Court's order.
When determining what is just and equitable under section 4(7) of the PIE Act, a court must consider the occupiers' right to earn a living, particularly where vulnerable groups are involved. The State's obligation to provide temporary emergency accommodation under section 26(3) of the Constitution requires reasonable action that respects the dignity of occupiers and recognizes that human rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. Adequate housing, including temporary emergency accommodation, must be in a location that allows access to employment opportunities. A municipality acts unreasonably when it imposes conditions on temporary emergency accommodation that arbitrarily prevent occupiers from earning a lawful living, without legal justification. Waste picking - the collection, sorting and storing of recyclable materials for sale - is not a commercial activity excluded from PIE Act protection but a means of earning a living that must be considered in eviction proceedings.
The Court made several important observations: (1) It noted that despite nearly two decades since the Modderklip case and a plethora of legislation and case law, the problem of homelessness persists in South Africa as a painful legacy of apartheid spatial planning. (2) The Court observed that waste picking occurs in unequal societies where some are wealthy enough to discard items with value while others are so poor they must salvage from waste to support their families. (3) The Court emphasized that temporary accommodation must entail more than just a roof and four walls - it must include all that is reasonably necessary to make it adequate. (4) The Court noted that section 39(1) of the Constitution requires courts to consider international law, and section 39(2) requires promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation. (5) The Court referenced the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action's recognition that human rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. (6) The Court approved of the statement in Charnell that reasonable housing measures must give sufficient weight to the most needy and vulnerable so they can live in conditions of dignity, equality and freedom.
This case is significant in South African housing and socio-economic rights jurisprudence because it: (1) Affirms that the right to earn a living is a relevant factor in determining just and equitable evictions under the PIE Act. (2) Recognizes the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights, particularly in the context of temporary emergency accommodation. (3) Clarifies that waste picking is not a commercial activity but a means of survival that should be protected. (4) Reinforces the principle established in cases like Joe Slovo and Dladla that the location of temporary emergency accommodation must consider residents' employment opportunities. (5) Demonstrates how international law, particularly the ICESCR which South Africa ratified in 2015, informs the interpretation of socio-economic rights in domestic law. (6) Extends the jurisprudence on what constitutes 'adequate' temporary emergency accommodation beyond mere shelter to include conditions enabling dignified living. (7) Addresses the ongoing challenge of homelessness in post-apartheid South Africa and municipalities' obligations in eviction proceedings.
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