In October 2002, the respondent (South African Post Office Limited) advertised for tenders to provide guarding services for post offices in six regions. The appellant (Command Protection Services (Gauteng)(Pty) Ltd t/a Maxi Security) submitted tender documents in November 2002 (PC2) for all six regions. The tender document stated that acceptance would be by letter and would constitute an agreement. On 28 July 2003, the respondent sent a letter of acceptance (PC3), stating 'this appointment is subject to: (x) BEE improvement; and (x) the successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract.' The appellant accepted this letter. At a meeting on 30 July 2003, parties agreed the appellant would provide services in three of the six regions from 1 September 2003. The appellant commenced providing services on 1 September 2003 while parties negotiated terms of a formal contract through multiple drafts prepared by the respondent's attorney. The drafts differed substantially from the original tender and included detailed BEE requirements. On 30 January 2004, the respondent wrote to the appellant terminating the relationship, citing various breaches and stating that negotiations for a written agreement would not continue and the month-to-month relationship would end on 29 February 2004. The appellant sued for damages of approximately R14 million claiming breach of contract formed by PC2 and PC3.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The court affirmed the judgment of Poswa J in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, dismissing the appellant's action with costs.
Where a letter purporting to accept a tender states that the appointment is 'subject to' specified matters including 'the successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract', this does not constitute an unconditional acceptance creating a binding contract on the terms of the tender. Rather, it constitutes a conditional acceptance or counter-offer indicating that no binding contract will come into existence until the specified conditions are fulfilled. Whether an initial agreement acquires contractual force despite outstanding issues requiring negotiation depends on the intention of the parties, which must be gathered from their conduct, the terms of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances. Where the expression 'subject to' introduces requirements for further negotiation and successful finalisation of a formal contract, the proper inference is that the parties intended there would be no binding contractual relationship until the negotiation process was successfully completed and a formal agreement concluded.
The court made observations about the concept of suspensive conditions, noting that the stipulation making the appointment 'subject to the successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract' could never have been intended as a suspensive condition in the true sense. If a formal contract were finalised and signed, this would not result in the agreement constituted by the acceptance becoming operative, but rather a new agreement would come into operation. The court also noted, without deciding, that the agreement to negotiate that came into existence might not be enforceable in light of decisions such as Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA) and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), but stated this did not need to be considered as it was not the agreement the appellant relied upon. The court observed that evidence suggested the appellant rendered guarding services from 1 September 2003 on terms agreed at a meeting on 12 August 2003 that were substantially different from those in PC2 and PC3, though this was not determinative of the appeal.
This case is significant in South African contract law for clarifying the distinction between: (1) situations where offer and acceptance create a binding contract with some issues left for later negotiation, and (2) situations where offer and acceptance lack animus contrahendi because they are conditional upon consensus being reached on outstanding issues through further negotiation. The case provides important guidance on interpreting letters of acceptance in tender processes, particularly where such letters use the expression 'subject to' followed by conditions. It demonstrates that where acceptance is made subject to 'successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract', this typically indicates no binding contract exists until that process is completed. The judgment emphasizes that the intention of the parties must be gathered from their conduct, the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. It also illustrates that commencement of performance does not necessarily confirm the existence of a contract on particular terms, as such performance may be pursuant to a collateral agreement. The case is important for commercial parties engaged in tender processes and contract negotiations, particularly in understanding when legal obligations arise.
Explore 1 related case • Click to navigate