Knoop N O and Another v Islandsite Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd and Others; Islandsite Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Knoop N O and Others

Islandsite Investments 180 (Pty) Ltd was placed under business rescue in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, with Messrs Knoop and Klopper appointed as business rescue practitioners (BRPs). A business rescue plan mandated the sale of Islandsite’s immovable property in Constantia, Cape Town. The property was also subject to a preservation order under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, with a curator appointed. The BRPs, after consulting the curator, concluded a sale agreement with Mr Cooke. Ms Ronica Ragavan, Islandsite’s sole director and herself facing criminal prosecution, objected to the sale and launched urgent proceedings in the Free State High Court. The application was brought in two parts: Part A sought interim interdictory relief restraining transfer of the property, which was granted; Part B sought review of the BRPs’ decision, setting aside the business rescue, and termination of the BRPs’ appointments. While an appeal against the Part A interim interdict was pending, Part B was heard and dismissed on grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction and that Ms Ragavan lacked locus standi. The interim interdict was discharged. The property was thereafter transferred to Mr Cooke.

Both appeals were dismissed as moot in terms of s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. The application by the fourth respondent to adduce new evidence was granted. Costs in the first appeal were awarded against the BRPs, and costs in the second appeal were awarded against Ms Ragavan personally, including costs of two counsel where applicable.

The judgment reaffirms the doctrine of mootness in South African appellate procedure and underscores that interim interdicts have no independent lifespan once discharged by subsequent proceedings. It clarifies the SCA’s discretion under s 16 of the Superior Courts Act and reinforces limits on directors’ authority to litigate on behalf of companies under business rescue without proper consent. The case is significant for business rescue practitioners and litigants seeking urgent interdictory relief pending review proceedings.