Trustees of Parkrand Body Corporate v Farlane Anthea (Owner unit 99)

The applicant, the Trustees of Parkrand Body Corporate, brought an application to the Community Schemes Ombud Service (CSOS) under section 38 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 seeking financial relief under section 39(1)(e). The respondent, Ms Anthea Farlane, is the registered owner of Unit 99 in the Parkrand sectional title scheme in Boksburg, Gauteng. The body corporate alleged that as at 11 November 2023 the respondent owed arrear amounts of R25 287.13. The application was lodged on 20 September 2023, with the required trustee resolution having been attached on 31 August 2023. Conciliation did not resolve the dispute, a certificate of non-resolution was issued, and the matter was referred to adjudication. A section 43 notice was issued to the respondent, but she filed no response. The adjudication therefore proceeded on the papers and on the basis of largely undisputed facts.

• Whether the applicant body corporate had established entitlement to an order under section 39(1)(e) of the CSOS Act for payment of arrear contributions or other amounts by the respondent owner.
• Whether the applicant had complied with the procedural requirements of the CSOS Act and practice directives, including authority to bring the application and exhaustion of internal remedies.
• Whether, in the absence of any response from the respondent, the evidence before the adjudicator justified granting the monetary relief claimed.
• Whether the applicant was entitled to recover costs and legal fees in addition to the arrear amount.

The application succeeded in part. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant R25 287.13 within five months of the order. The first payment of R5 057.40 was to be made on 1 January 2024, followed by equal monthly instalments on the first day of each subsequent month. If the respondent defaulted on any instalment, the full outstanding amount of R25 287.13 would become payable within 30 days of the first default. No order as to costs was made.

A body corporate that has properly authorised litigation, complied with CSOS procedures, and established on a balance of probabilities that an owner owes arrear contributions or related amounts is entitled to an order under section 39(1)(e) of the CSOS Act compelling payment. In CSOS proceedings, a claim for additional legal costs will not be granted merely because scheme rules provide for such recovery; the relief must be consistent with the statutory purpose and framework of the CSOS Act.

The adjudicator remarked that CSOS is the primary forum for disputes of this nature and cited authority supporting the proposition that courts may decline to hear such matters as a forum of first instance. The adjudicator also commented that Conduct Rule 23, which purported to make owners liable for attorney-and-client collection costs, was 'oppressive, archaic and incongruent' with the CSOS legal framework, and suggested that the body corporate’s rules may not have undergone recent CSOS scrutiny under section 10(2)(b) of the STSMA. No official law-report citation beyond the case number appears in the text, so the citation is given from the adjudication reference and date.

This adjudication illustrates the use of the CSOS Act as the primary statutory mechanism for recovery of arrear levies or contributions by bodies corporate from owners in sectional title schemes. It reinforces that, where procedural requirements are met and the owner does not dispute the debt, CSOS may grant direct payment orders under section 39(1)(e). It is also significant for its rejection of automatic reliance on body corporate rules purporting to impose attorney-and-client costs in the CSOS context, emphasising the cost-effective and informal nature of CSOS proceedings.