The first appellant, Ba-Gat Motors CC, operated a used-car dealership and entered into a written sub-lease agreement with the respondent, Kempster Sedgwick (Pty) Ltd, on 21 February 2017 for premises for the period 15 March 2017 to 30 September 2020. The monthly rental was R100,000 plus VAT, escalating by 8% annually. The second appellant, Gybertus Pitzer, was the sole member of the first appellant and bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor. The agreement contained a non-variation clause (clause 13.3) requiring any variation, cancellation or waiver to be in writing and signed by both parties. The first appellant paid escalated rent up to April 2019, then refused to pay further rent. The appellants alleged that during May/June 2018, the respondent's representatives (including Thomas Reyneke, Steve Atkinson and Org Robertse) requested them to vacate the premises as the respondent needed them for a Subaru dealership. The appellants alleged that after viewing alternative premises and an empty stand, they concluded an oral cancellation agreement whereby the sub-lease would terminate upon securing alternative premises. The first appellant proceeded to construct new premises and vacated the leased premises. The respondent then sued for arrear rental from May 2019 to October 2019, amounting to R938,952, and applied for summary judgment.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The summary judgment granted by the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria in favour of the respondent was upheld.
Where a written contract contains a non-variation clause requiring variations, cancellations or waivers to be in writing and signed by the parties, any purported oral variation or cancellation is void and unenforceable, in accordance with the Shifren principle. The defence of estoppel by representation cannot be upheld where its effect would be to sanction non-compliance with a non-variation clause, as this would violate the Shifren principle and render the non-variation clause nugatory. While there may be very limited circumstances where estoppel could be framed without violating the Shifren principle, these do not include situations where the alleged representation relates to the oral cancellation or variation of the contract itself. A party relying on estoppel must show that a reasonable person in their position would have been misled by the conduct founding the estoppel. At summary judgment stage, where a defendant relies on an alleged oral cancellation or variation of a contract containing a non-variation clause, this does not constitute a bona fide defence good in law.
The court observed that courts have in the past, often on dubious grounds, attempted to avoid the Shifren principle where its application would result in a harsh outcome, typically by relying on waiver and estoppel. The court noted that in particular circumstances, a waiver of rights under a contract containing a non-variation clause may not violate the Shifren principle, for example where it amounts to a pactum de non petendo (agreement not to sue) or an indulgence in relation to previous imperfect performance. However, nothing of that nature arose in the present case. The court also commented that the Shifren principle has been recognized as representing 'a doctrinal and policy choice which, on balance, was sound' but acknowledged that there may be circumstances where an agreement will not be enforced because the object it seeks to achieve is contrary to public policy, or where fraud is involved. The minority judgment observed that the nature or extent of the narrow window for the defence of estoppel in relation to non-variation clauses has not been defined by South African courts, save to say that the Shifren principle must not be violated. The minority also noted that estoppel operates to prevent a party from denying the truth of a representation where the representee has acted thereon to his detriment, with the objective being to prevent litigants from escaping agreements they concluded for opportunistic reasons.
This case is significant in South African contract law as it reaffirms the strict application of the Shifren principle regarding non-variation clauses. It clarifies that the defence of estoppel by representation will rarely, if ever, be available to circumvent a non-variation clause, as upholding such a defence would negate the very purpose of the clause and sanction non-compliance with the parties' written agreement. The case demonstrates the court's approach to balancing freedom of contract and the sanctity of written agreements against equitable defences. It also illustrates the high threshold for resisting summary judgment applications where a non-variation clause is involved. The minority judgment highlights the ongoing tension between the strict Shifren approach and considerations of fairness where parties may have acted on representations to their detriment. The case is important for commercial parties in understanding the narrow scope for avoiding non-variation clauses and the need to comply strictly with formalities when varying or cancelling written agreements.