NutriFlo and NutriFertilizer (the complainants) lodged a first complaint with the Competition Commission in November 2002 against Sasol alleging contraventions of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. In October 2003, the Commission issued a certificate of non-referral due to insufficient evidence. The complainants did not refer the matter directly to the Tribunal. On 3 November 2003, the complainants lodged a second complaint, this time including Kynoch and Omnia as respondents. The Commission obtained two extensions from the complainants to investigate: the first extended the investigation period to 28 February 2005, and the second to 30 April 2005. On 4 May 2005, the Commission referred the second complaint to the Competition Tribunal. Both Sasol and Omnia sought to review and set aside the referral on grounds that: (1) the second extension was incompetent and the referral was therefore out of time; (2) the second complaint was substantially the same as the first complaint which had received a non-referral certificate; and (3) the Commission acted unconstitutionally by making prejudicial press statements revealing confidential information.
Both applications dismissed with costs, including costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 50(4)(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 permits the Competition Commission and complainant to agree to multiple extensions of the one-year investigation period, provided each extension is agreed before the expiry of the previous period. Every extension is an extension of the initial one-year period referred to in section 50(2). (2) The functus officio doctrine has very limited, if any, application to the Competition Commission's statutory investigative function. The Commission is not precluded from reconsidering a prior decision not to refer a complaint where new facts come to light, absent an ulterior motive. The Commission may refer a second complaint even where it bears some similarity to a first complaint in respect of which a non-referral certificate was issued, provided the complaints are not identical. (3) Section 67(2) of the Competition Act does not prevent referral of a complaint where no proceedings regarding an earlier complaint have been completed before the Tribunal. (4) A "complaint" under the Competition Act is defined by the specific facts and conduct relied upon, not merely by the legal category of prohibited practice alleged. Whether two complaints are the same depends on whether they are based on substantially the same conduct, which requires examination of the factual foundation, not just legal similarity.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) The purpose of the time limit in section 50(2) is primarily to protect complainants rather than respondents, as complainants cannot proceed with their own complaint referral or bring civil damages claims without a certificate of non-referral from the Commission. (2) The Court noted that the Commission's decision to issue a press statement at the time of referral was raised as a constitutional issue by Sasol but this ground was not fully developed or decided. (3) The Court observed that the Commission could have initiated a fresh complaint under section 49B(1) in relation to the new information it obtained during the merger hearing, but chose instead to investigate under the second complaint submitted by the complainants. (4) The Court distinguished the protection offered by section 67(2), noting that it prevents referral of complaints against firms that have been respondents in "completed proceedings" before the Tribunal relating to substantially the same conduct. The word "completed" suggests that incomplete proceedings or non-referrals do not trigger this protection. (5) The Court emphasized that interpreting the Act in a manner consistent with the Constitution requires consideration of respondents' privacy rights (section 14 of the Constitution), but found that the statutory language and purpose supported the interpretation permitting multiple extensions.
This case is significant in South African competition law as it establishes important principles regarding the procedural powers of the Competition Commission. It clarifies that the Commission has flexibility in managing complaint investigations through multiple agreed extensions, balancing the need for thorough investigation against respondents' rights. The judgment also importantly limits the application of functus officio to the Commission's investigative function, recognizing that the Commission must retain the power to reconsider matters when new evidence emerges in order to fulfill its statutory mandate. The case demonstrates a purposive approach to interpreting the Competition Act that promotes the Commission's ability to investigate anticompetitive conduct while still protecting respondents' rights through procedural safeguards. It provides guidance on distinguishing between complaints based on whether they involve the same conduct and facts, not merely similar legal categories of prohibited practices.