In 2001, the appellant (Silouette Investments Limited) and co-plaintiff (Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd) instituted action against the respondent (Virgin Hotels Group Limited), a British company, for amounts owing under a written agreement for the sale of shares. In November 2004, the plaintiffs gave notice to substitute John Brook Dyer as plaintiff, alleging he had acquired their claims by cession in 2003. This amendment was effected in April 2005. The respondent pleaded that under the sale agreement the sellers were not entitled to cede their rights. In October 2006, notice was given to re-substitute the appellant as plaintiff in place of Mr Dyer, which was effected on 10 November 2006. The respondent then raised a special plea of prescription based on s 11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, arguing that the debt was due on or before 30 September 2001 and that more than three years had elapsed since the November 2006 amendment that reintroduced the appellant as plaintiff. The High Court (Joffe J) upheld the special plea. The respondent was incorporated and registered in the United Kingdom with its domicilium citandi et executandi in London, but had consented to the jurisdiction of the Johannesburg High Court and agreed to accept service care of its South African attorneys.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including those occasioned by the employment of two counsel. The special plea of prescription raised by the respondent was upheld.
A foreign company is not 'outside the Republic' for purposes of s 13(1)(b) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 where it has consented to the jurisdiction of South African courts and has authorized South African attorneys to accept service on its behalf, as in such circumstances there is no legal or practical impediment to the creditor instituting proceedings. Where a plaintiff is substituted out of proceedings by amendment and later reintroduced by further amendment, the interruption of prescription effected by the original summons lapses under s 15(2) because the original plaintiff did not successfully prosecute its claim under the original process to final judgment. If judgment is ultimately obtained, it would be under the later amendment reintroducing the plaintiff, not the original summons.
The Court noted that it was not necessary to decide whether amenability to personal jurisdiction in circumstances where an internationally enforceable judgment could be obtained would alone suffice to prevent a debtor from being regarded as 'outside the Republic', as the combined effect of submission to jurisdiction and authorization to accept service was sufficient to decide the case. The Court referred to American jurisprudence on 'tolling' of statutes of limitation, noting cases which held that the purpose of eliminating stale claims would be contravened if the limitation period were suspended during mere physical absence of a party who remained subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court also distinguished Grinaker Mechanicals by noting that amenability to jurisdiction based on attachment ad fundandam jurisdictionem (which only binds the property attached and has no extra-territorial force) differs from amenability based on voluntary submission to jurisdiction (which binds the debtor personally and is internationally enforceable).
This case provides important guidance on the interpretation of s 13(1)(b) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 regarding when a debtor is considered 'outside the Republic'. It establishes that a foreign debtor who consents to South African jurisdiction and authorizes local attorneys to accept service is not 'outside the Republic' for purposes of delaying prescription. The judgment adopts a purposive interpretation of the provision, focusing on whether there is a genuine legal or practical impediment to instituting proceedings, rather than simply the physical location of the debtor. The case also clarifies the application of s 15(2) in circumstances where plaintiffs are substituted through amendments, holding that the interruption of prescription lapses where the original plaintiff does not prosecute the claim to final judgment before being substituted out and then back into the proceedings.