Primedia Broadcasting (A Division of Primedia (Pty) Ltd) and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others

The case arose from events during the 2015 State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 12 February 2015. The State Security Agency used a telecommunications signal jamming device without Parliament's permission, disrupting cell phone signals when the sitting began. When EFF members questioned President Zuma about Nkandla and refused to leave when ordered, security forcibly removed them. During the scuffle, the parliamentary broadcast feed showed only the Speaker's face, not the removal of the MPs. The appellants (Primedia Broadcasting, SANEF, Right2Know Campaign, and Open Democracy Advice Centre) challenged: (1) the use of the jamming device; and (2) Parliament's Broadcasting Policy (clause 8.3.3.2) and Television Broadcasting Rules (Rule 2) that required cameras to focus only on the presiding officer during "grave disorder" or "unparliamentary behaviour". The Western Cape High Court majority dismissed the application (Savage J dissenting), leading to this appeal.

• Whether Parliament's Broadcasting Policy clause 8.3.3.2 and Television Broadcasting Rule 2, which restrict broadcasting of disorder in Parliament, are constitutional
• Whether the manner in which the 2015 SONA proceedings were broadcast violated the constitutional right to an open Parliament
• Whether the use of a telecommunications signal jamming device in Parliament without the permission of the Speaker and Chairperson was lawful
• Whether the constitutional right to public access to and involvement in Parliament (sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution) was violated
• The test for determining whether limitations on the right to an open Parliament are reasonable

1. The appeal was upheld with costs of two counsel. 2. The order of the high court was set aside and replaced with declarations that: (a) Clause 8.3.3.2 of Parliament's Policy on Broadcasting and Rule 2 of Parliament's Television Broadcasting Rules are unconstitutional and unlawful as they violate the right to an open Parliament; (b) The manner in which the February 2015 SONA proceedings were broadcast was unconstitutional and unlawful; (c) The use of a signal jamming device in Parliament without permission of the Speaker and Chairperson is contrary to section 4(1) of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004 and is unlawful. (d) The respondents were ordered to pay costs including two counsel.

Parliament's rules and policies that restrict the broadcasting of disorder in the parliamentary chamber by requiring cameras to focus only on the presiding officer during incidents of "grave disorder" or "unparliamentary behaviour" constitute unreasonable limitations on the constitutional right to an open Parliament under sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution. Such restrictions are unconstitutional because: (1) they serve no legitimate purpose as disorder will be reported by other means anyway; (2) they deprive the public of the most direct and accurate means of information—television broadcasts; (3) they prevent the public from seeing how their elected representatives and parliamentary officials behave, which is a matter of legitimate public interest; (4) there is no evidence that broadcasting disorder encourages further disorder; and (5) the limitations are not minor but affect the primary means by which most people obtain information about Parliament. The use of telecommunications signal jamming devices in Parliament without the express permission of the Speaker and Chairperson violates section 4(1) of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004, which requires such permission before security services can perform policing functions in the parliamentary precincts.

The court noted that while it was asked to craft alternative broadcasting provisions for Parliament, it declined to do so as this would intrude on the Legislature's domain. Parliament has the prerogative to determine its own rules and policy, provided the measures adopted are reasonable limitations of the right to an open Parliament. The court also observed that "loud, rowdy and fractious" political life is good for democracy (citing Democratic Alliance v ANC), and that political speech is at the heart of freedom of expression. The court distinguished this case from Multichoice (the Pistorius trial broadcasting case), noting that limitations on broadcasting to protect fair trial rights differ fundamentally from limitations on the public's right to an open Parliament. The court emphasized that it is not for Parliament to determine how people will react to what happens in the Chamber—the public is entitled to know exactly what happens and may evaluate their elected representatives' performance for themselves. While comparative analysis of international parliamentary broadcasting practices was interesting, the court stated it must determine constitutionality in the context of South Africa's Constitution and the nature of South African democracy.

This case is a landmark judgment on the constitutional right to an open Parliament in South Africa. It affirms that openness and public participation are foundational values of South African democracy (section 1(d) of the Constitution) and that the public has a constitutional right to see and hear what happens in Parliament through sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution. The judgment establishes that accurate, unfiltered broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings, including disorder and controversial moments, is essential for meaningful democratic participation. It rejected the paternalistic approach that Parliament can decide what the public should see, emphasizing that citizens must be able to judge their elected representatives' conduct for themselves. The case reinforces the critical role of media freedom in a democracy, particularly regarding political speech. It also clarified that Parliament's independence from executive security services must be protected, and that any security measures that might interfere with Parliament's functioning require explicit parliamentary authorization. The judgment balances parliamentary autonomy with constitutional rights, applying a reasonableness test that requires evidence-based justification for limitations on openness rather than mere speculation or assertion.