On 4 February 2004, Joseph Michael Pestana held an account at Nedbank's Carletonville branch with a credit balance of R496,546.40. He instructed the branch to transfer R480,000 to the account of Jose Manuel Pestana (the plaintiff), also held at the same branch. At 11h33, the branch executed the transfer and credited the plaintiff's account. Earlier that morning at 8h44, SARS had sent a section 99 notice to Nedbank's head office in Rivonia appointing the bank as agent for Pestana in respect of a tax debt of approximately R340 million. The branch was only notified of this appointment after it had already transferred the funds to the plaintiff's account. Upon receiving notice, the branch unilaterally reversed the transfer and paid R496,000 to SARS from Pestana's account, without requesting or obtaining the plaintiff's authority to reverse the transaction.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The High Court full bench's decision in favor of the plaintiff was upheld, affirming that the bank was not entitled to reverse the payment of R480,000 without the plaintiff's authority.
Once a bank has executed a valid mandate and completed an unconditional transfer of funds by crediting a client's account, the credit belongs to that client and the bank cannot unilaterally reverse the transaction without the client's authority. A section 99 notice under the Income Tax Act appointing a bank as SARS's agent does not freeze the taxpayer's account, effect a cession of funds, or divest the taxpayer of ownership of funds in the account. Notice to a bank's head office does not constitute constructive notice to all branches; until a branch receives actual notice of a section 99 appointment, it is entitled to continue ordinary banking operations including executing valid client mandates. When a bank branch executes a transfer in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a valid mandate, it intends both to pay on behalf of the debtor and to accept payment on behalf of the creditor, constituting a completed juristic act independent of any underlying causa.
The court noted examples of circumstances where a bank may validly reverse a credit entry, including: where a deposited cheque bears a forged signature; where deposited bank notes are subsequently discovered to be forgeries; where a credit is treated as provisional subject to a hold period under standard banking practice; where funds were obtained by fraud or theft; or where a wrong account was erroneously credited. The court emphasized that courts are bound by agreed facts in a stated case under Uniform Rule 33 and cannot speculate beyond those parameters or read between the lines to infer facts not presented, such as potential fraud. The court observed that while section 99 appointment has been characterized as a form of garnishment similar to that available for civil judgments, it does not have an effect similar to seizure of funds.
This case establishes important principles regarding the finality of banking transactions and the limits of a bank's unilateral right to reverse completed transfers. It clarifies that section 99 of the Income Tax Act, while appointing a bank as agent for SARS, does not operate as a freeze or seizure of funds, nor does it divest the account holder of ownership. The judgment reinforces the principle that once an unconditional payment has been completed by crediting a client's account, the bank cannot unilaterally reverse it without the client's consent, even when acting under statutory appointment. The case has significant implications for banking law, emphasizing the need for banks to ensure timely internal communication of statutory notices and protecting clients' rights in completed banking transactions. It has generated considerable academic discussion regarding electronic fund transfers and banks' rights to reverse transactions.