Mr Christiaan Serfontein Edeling was admitted as an advocate in March 1979 and practised at the Johannesburg and Free State Bars. In December 1997, he was struck from the roll of advocates by the Witwatersrand Local Division for serious dishonesty. The striking off arose from his involvement in fraudulent VAT schemes with Mr Glyn Rudolph, including the sale of his own home for R73 million (worth R850,000-R1 million) and attempted purchase of the St Margaret's property for R120 million (valued at R2.5 million) using inflated promissory notes to obtain improper VAT refunds. The high court found he participated in simulated transactions, made misrepresentations to revenue authorities, perjured himself in the Special Income Tax Court and the striking off proceedings, and made untruthful and insulting statements about senior members of the Bar. His applications for leave to appeal to the SCA and Constitutional Court were dismissed. In 2009 and 2015, he brought ex parte applications for re-admission. The Society opposed both. The court a quo granted the 2015 application. The Society appealed.
The appeal was upheld with costs including costs of two counsel. The order of the court a quo granting re-admission was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the application with costs, such costs to include costs of two counsel.
An applicant for re-admission as an advocate after being struck off for dishonesty must demonstrate genuine, complete and permanent reformation by: (1) explicitly acknowledging and accepting the dishonest conduct that led to the striking off; (2) properly identifying the specific character defect involved; (3) making full and candid disclosure of all matters material to fitness to practice; (4) showing cognitive appreciation that the defect has been cured; and (5) proving through conduct and evidence that reformation is genuine and permanent. Where an applicant claims to have genuinely believed fraudulent conduct was lawful while simultaneously claiming to accept court findings of dishonesty, this demonstrates lack of insight into fundamental dishonesty and failure to satisfy the onus. Re-admission of an advocate (unlike attorneys under specific statutory provisions) is not discretionary but depends on factual proof that the applicant is a fit and proper person. The court's duty is to protect the public and the profession's good name by ensuring no danger exists from re-admission.
The court made several significant observations: (1) Being a fit and proper person to practise as an advocate is not territorially confined - resuming practice in Lesotho without disclosure while a re-admission application was pending in South Africa displayed arrogant disregard for the law and the belief that citizens of Lesotho were not entitled to the same protection as South Africans against dishonest lawyers; (2) Character references are unhelpful unless they demonstrate knowledge of the applicant's wrongdoings and the personality traits that gave rise to them; (3) An advocate deciding unilaterally that he is fit to resume practice borders on contempt of court and is certainly unethical and unprofessional; (4) The psychologist's description of Mr Edeling's tendency to present himself in a favorable light and minimize limitations was prescient in showing lack of genuine reformation; (5) The letter misrepresenting the basis of Mr Edeling's striking off to secure the Krion appointment was fundamentally misleading, describing removal as arising from a dispute over arcane tax law rather than dishonesty and perjury.
This case reinforces the exacting standards required for re-admission of advocates struck off for dishonesty. It establishes that: (1) Applicants must explicitly acknowledge and demonstrate genuine acceptance of the dishonest conduct that led to striking off, not merely express general contrition; (2) Complete and candid disclosure is essential in ex parte re-admission applications; (3) Self-serving characterizations of past misconduct as technical errors or exploitation of loopholes, when courts found deliberate dishonesty, indicate lack of reformation; (4) Resuming practice in another jurisdiction without proper disclosure demonstrates continued character defects; (5) Re-admission is not discretionary for advocates (unlike attorneys under statute) but requires factual proof of fitness; (6) The fundamental question is whether there has been genuine, complete and permanent reformation requiring cognitive appreciation of the character defect. The case serves as a warning that dishonesty strikes at the core of an advocate's fitness and requires unequivocal acknowledgment and demonstrable reform over an extended period.
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