On 15 September 2004, Patrick Ngobeni was shot by metro police officer Thabo Ledwaba at an intersection in Johannesburg. Ngobeni sustained two bullet wounds and was rendered paraplegic. He was arrested and detained while in hospital. The incident began when metro police officers Ledwaba and Mandlakayise Mabaso stopped Ngobeni for a traffic violation at approximately 01h15. During the stop, Ledwaba found a cocked semi-automatic Norinco pistol on Ngobeni's vehicle seat and verified its license. According to the defendant's version, while Mabaso was searching Ngobeni, the latter produced a second unlicensed Star PD pistol from his vehicle, cocked it, pointed it at Mabaso, and struck him in the eye with it. Ledwaba then fired three shots from the Norinco in defense of his colleague. Ngobeni's version was that Ledwaba negligently and accidentally discharged the firearm while checking the vehicle's license disc. Ngobeni sued the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Council for damages arising from wrongful shooting, arrest and detention.
The appeal was upheld with costs including those for two counsel. The High Court order was set aside in its entirety and replaced with an order dismissing the plaintiff's claim with costs.
1. In civil trials, judges must act as impartial arbiters and not descend into the arena by conducting their own investigation, extensively questioning witnesses in a manner resembling cross-examination, or calling witnesses mero motu without party consent and proper justification. 2. When faced with two mutually destructive versions in a civil case, the court must determine which party bears the onus of proof. The party bearing the onus can only succeed if the court is satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities that their version is true and the other version is false, having regard to credibility and the balance of probabilities, tested against objective evidence. 3. Where a plaintiff abandons a claim based on intentional wrongdoing and pursues only a claim of negligence, the defendant need not prove justification as that defense does not apply to negligence claims. The plaintiff bears the onus of proving negligence. 4. When conducting an inspection in loco, especially when ordered mero motu by the court, the judge must explain the reasons, place observations on the record, and allow parties to comment on those observations. 5. Judicial officers may not improperly intrude upon the constitutional independence of the National Prosecuting Authority by suggesting prosecutors should await a civil judgment before making charging decisions.
The court made several obiter observations: (1) The conduct of Spilg J, while constituting irregularities that would normally vitiate proceedings, was addressed substantively only because the parties requested the court consider the appeal on its merits. (2) The court noted that the quality of the trial judge's views appeared to have been impaired, as evidenced by his pre-judgment that Mabaso was guilty and his desire that the NPA await his judgment. (3) The court observed that even poor police investigation and failure to properly secure a scene does not necessarily indicate conspiracy, but may simply reveal ineptitude. (4) The judgment noted that Spilg J's conduct "has the potential of bringing the judiciary into disrepute" and stated that such conduct "cannot be countenanced." (5) The court emphasized that rule 39 of the Uniform Rules of Court governs trial procedure and incorporates the principles articulated in Jones v National Coal Board regarding the proper role of judges in the adversarial system.
This case is significant for establishing important principles regarding judicial conduct in South African law. It emphasizes that judges must remain impartial arbiters and not descend into the arena of conflict. The judgment reinforces the principles set out in S v Rall regarding proper judicial behavior: judges must ensure justice is seen to be done, refrain from questioning that precludes objective adjudication, and avoid intimidating or harassing witnesses. The case also clarifies the proper approach when dealing with two mutually destructive versions in civil cases, emphasizing the importance of properly determining and applying the onus of proof and testing versions against objective evidence and probabilities. It serves as an important reminder of the limits of judicial intervention in civil trials and the constitutional separation of powers, particularly regarding prosecutorial independence.
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