On 5 November 1996, a transit robbery occurred on the Bloemfontein-Dealesville road where over six million Rand was stolen. Three stolen vehicles were used to block the armoured vehicle. Three accused stood trial on charges of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted murder and three counts of motor vehicle theft. The fourth accused (no 2) was withdrawn. The State's case rested partly on pointing-out evidence (which was excluded after a trial-within-a-trial) and on fingerprint and palm print evidence. No 1's fingerprints were found on the cleaned reverse side of forged number plates of two stolen vehicles. No 4's palm print was found on the driver's cabin of one stolen vehicle near the left front door. The State's expert testified the prints must have been fresh as the vehicles had recently been thoroughly washed. At the end of the State's case, accused no 1's attorney indicated he intended to call his client to testify. The trial judge (Edeling J) then questioned what the State had against accused no 1, to which the attorney responded he would have called him but the State had presented no evidence. All three accused then applied for discharge, which the State opposed for nos 1 and 4. Edeling J found there was no prima facie case and nothing to answer, but nonetheless refused the discharge application. The defence attorneys then closed their cases without calling evidence, resulting in acquittal.
Both appeals dismissed. The appeal against the refusal to reserve the two legal questions was partly not competent and otherwise could not succeed. The appeal against the refusal of condonation became academic.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Questions regarding whether evidence establishes a prima facie case are questions of fact, not law, and cannot be reserved for consideration by an appeal court at the instance of the State following an acquittal (applying Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg 1993 (1) SA 777 (A)); (2) A trial judge has a duty to ensure justice is done and may, without compromising impartiality, bring to the attention of the parties that in the court's opinion the State has not made out a prima facie case, whether or not an application for discharge has been made; (3) The regularity of a trial court's intervention to alert parties to perceived deficiencies in the State's case does not depend on the correctness of the court's factual assessment - it is not irregular for a court to express such an opinion even if that opinion proves to be wrong; (4) The precedent system in South African law applies only to legal principles, not to factual determinations - decisions on facts have binding force only inter partes and should not be cited or relied upon as binding authority in other cases.
The Court made several important observations: (1) While not deciding the point definitively, the Court expressed doubt whether the trial judge's refusal of the discharge application was a proper exercise of discretion given his finding that there was no prima facie case and nothing to answer (referencing S v Jama 1998 (2) SACR 237 (N)); (2) The Court had reservations about the remarks made by the trial judge during the course of evidence and in his judgment on the trial-within-a-trial, though this finding was final and had to be left alone; (3) The Court noted the problematic practice of reporting decisions that turn purely on factual assessments, which reinforces the erroneous belief that such decisions have precedential value; (4) The Court observed that where there are charges of motor vehicle theft and fingerprints are found on forged number plates, the age of the fingerprints would not necessarily be decisive in any event; (5) The Court suggested that the superficial and incorrect approach to fingerprint evidence by the trial judge had the consequence that persons against whom the State had a case requiring an answer were conceivably wrongly acquitted, though this could not be remedied given the limitations on the State's right of appeal.
This case is significant in South African criminal law for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the evidential value of fingerprint evidence and confirms that while normally probative and often decisive, its value depends on the totality of the evidence in each case; (2) It definitively establishes that questions regarding the sufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case are questions of fact, not law, and therefore cannot be reserved for appeal by the State following an acquittal; (3) It reaffirms the limited nature of the State's right of appeal in criminal matters - the State cannot appeal an acquittal on the merits; (4) It clarifies the proper role of the trial judge in criminal proceedings, affirming the duty to ensure justice is done while maintaining impartiality, including the duty to alert parties when no prima facie case appears to have been made out; (5) It addresses the problematic practice of treating factual decisions as binding precedent, emphasizing that the precedent system applies only to legal principles, not factual determinations; (6) The judgment notes that Edeling J's decision had been incorrectly cited and used as binding authority, highlighting the danger of reporting and relying on purely factual decisions as precedent.
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