The applicant provides certified training programs for persons working at heights and supplies specialized safety equipment. The first respondent (Mose) was employed as a training facilitator by the applicant from 9 January 2017 and was dismissed on 10 December 2018. His employment contract contained a restraint of trade clause prohibiting him from working for competing businesses for three years after termination within a 200 km radius of specified locations. Prior to joining the applicant, Mose had completed eight training courses related to working at heights. While employed by the applicant, he completed a further nine training courses at the applicant's expense, valued at approximately R400,000. After his dismissal, Mose joined the second respondent (Evolution Height Safety), a competitor of the applicant, working as a training facilitator in the same capacity. The applicant sought to enforce the full restraint for three years. The respondents conceded Mose was in breach of the restraint but disputed the applicant's protectable interests and the reasonableness of the restraint. The applicant also alleged the second respondent breached a 'gentlemen's agreement' in the industry not to poach employees.
[1] The matter was dealt with as urgent under Rule 8 of the Labour Court Rules. [2] The first and second respondents were interdicted from directly or indirectly contacting clients of the applicant for whom the first respondent performed training while employed by the applicant, and from providing training services to such clients for 18 months from termination (until 24 April 2020). [3] The first respondent was interdicted from being engaged in the supply of 'working at height' safety gear and fall arrest equipment to customers who were the applicant's customers at termination, for 18 months (until 10 June 2020). [4] No order as to costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The Labour Court's jurisdiction under section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act does not extend to delictual claims for unlawful interference with employment contracts, as such claims do not constitute 'matters concerning a contract of employment' but rather require determination of elements of delictual liability (harm, wrongful conduct, causation, and fault) which are not primarily concerned with enforcement of contractual obligations. (2) In restraint of trade cases involving training and skills acquisition, an employer's protectable interest is limited to proprietary know-how, specific product knowledge, and customer relationships developed during employment - it does not extend to general industry skills acquired through training. (3) A restraint of trade will only be enforced to the extent reasonably necessary to protect legitimate protectable interests, and courts will limit both the scope and duration of restraints to achieve an appropriate balance between protecting the employer's interests and allowing the employee to pursue their vocation.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) While the applicant alleged the existence of a 'gentlemen's agreement' in the industry not to poach employees, no evidence was adduced to support this claim beyond a bold assertion, and the court suggested that even if proved, it might not be relevant absent jurisdiction over delictual claims. (2) The court noted that the second respondent's employment of another former employee of the applicant in similar circumstances (Maluleke case) might give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the second respondent was engaged in poaching, though this was not established. (3) The court observed that facilitators in the Height Safety Industry are highly sought-after individuals requiring specialized skill sets. (4) The court commented that the purpose of the BCEA, as reflected in section 2, cannot by any imaginative interpretation be read as intending to provide for determination of delictual claims arising from breach of employment contracts. (5) The court noted that both parties were partially successful and that it would not be appropriate to award costs given the limited success obtained by the applicant.
This case is significant for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the limits of the Labour Court's jurisdiction under section 77(3) of the BCEA, establishing that concurrent jurisdiction over 'matters concerning a contract of employment' does not extend to delictual claims arising from breach of employment contracts, such as unlawful inducement to breach contract. (2) It illustrates the judicial approach to enforcing restraint of trade agreements in the specialized training sector, balancing employer interests in protecting customer relationships and proprietary methods against employee rights to utilize general skills and pursue their vocation. (3) It demonstrates that merely funding employee training does not automatically create a protectable interest in all skills acquired - only in truly proprietary or exclusive know-how. (4) It shows the court's willingness to tailor restraints to protect only legitimate interests, reducing both the scope and duration of restraints where the claimed interests are excessive. (5) The case contributes to jurisprudence on reasonableness of restraints in highly specialized industries where skilled workers are in demand.