RTS Industries and Others v Technical Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another

The first respondent (Technical Systems) manufactured auger machinery. The third appellant (Mr Kurtz) was previously employed by the first respondent as a plant engineer and gained intimate knowledge of the respondent's manufacturing processes and technical drawings. He had entered into a confidentiality undertaking and restraint of trade agreement. After leaving employment in 2009, Mr Kurtz became involved with the first appellant (RTS Industries), which began competing with the first respondent using similar products at lower prices. In 2014, the first respondent discovered that the appellants had reproduced and adapted 1179 of its copyrighted technical drawings and were unlawfully competing using confidential information. In 2015, the parties entered into a consent order (the 2015 order) which: (a) recognized the confidentiality of the first respondent's production process; (b) interdicted the appellants from using confidential information and infringing copyright in technical drawings for three years; (c) restrained the appellants from competing in the field for three years; and (d) prescribed a process (paragraphs 23-25) whereby after three years, experts would inspect the appellants' proposed production facility to determine compliance before the appellants could resume competing. In August 2019, the respondents discovered that the first appellant had allegedly sold auger to an Egyptian client before completing the paragraph 24-25 process. The respondents launched proceedings in 2019 seeking interim interdicts and a contempt order. On 9 March 2020, Mangcu-Lockwood AJ granted an interim interdict restraining the appellants from manufacturing and selling flat wire and auger pending completion of the 2015 order process, declared the appellants in contempt, and imposed a fine and costs order. The respondents subsequently abandoned all relief except the interim interdicts and costs. The appellants appealed with leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

• Whether the March 2020 order was appealable despite being characterized as an interim interdict
• Whether the order was final in effect and definitive of the parties' rights
• Whether the interests of justice required that an appeal against the interim order be entertained
• Whether the respondents should be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal under section 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act

The appeal was struck from the roll. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, including the costs of two counsel.

An interim interdict that operates only pending completion of a specified process or condition is not final in effect, is open to alteration by the court of first instance, and is therefore not appealable even if leave to appeal has been granted. The Supreme Court of Appeal is under no obligation to entertain an appeal against an unappealable order merely because leave to appeal was granted. The interests of justice do not require entertaining appeals against interim orders that have no final effect, are susceptible to reconsideration by the court a quo, and would result in piecemeal adjudication and wasteful use of judicial resources. Where an order is ancillary to interim relief and the main relief is clearly interim in nature, the entire order retains its interim character.

The Court observed that where both parties are before the court, the issues have been fully ventilated, and an order is granted that clearly endures only until certain conditions are complied with, there is no point in issuing a rule nisi. The Court noted that the determination of whether an interim order is appealable is fact-specific and that the factors that are relevant or decisive will vary from case to case. The Court also commented on the policy considerations underlying the principles of appealability: courts are loath to encourage wasteful use of judicial resources and legal costs by allowing appeals against interim orders that have no final effect and are susceptible to reconsideration when final relief is determined. Allowing appeals at an interlocutory stage would lead to piecemeal adjudication and delay the final determination of disputes.

This case reaffirms the established principles governing the appealability of interim interdicts in South African law. It applies the constitutional standard from City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum (that appeals should proceed when it best serves the interests of justice) alongside the traditional Zweni v Minister of Law and Order test (requiring finality in effect, definitiveness of rights, and disposal of substantial relief). The judgment demonstrates the Supreme Court of Appeal's continued reluctance to entertain appeals against interim orders that are not final in effect, even where leave to appeal has been granted. The decision emphasizes important policy considerations against piecemeal adjudication and wasteful use of judicial resources. It also confirms the restrictive approach to admitting further evidence on appeal under s 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act, requiring that such evidence be common cause, incontrovertible, or of an official/technical nature capable of easy verification, and not merely controversial or disputed.