Mulaudzi v The State

On 25 July 2005, a deceased was shot and killed during a robbery at his home in Limpopo. The deceased's mother, Ms Masindi Ramusetheli, witnessed the incident and saw two men, one of whom was the first accused, Tshimangadzo Leroy Mushweu. She was struck with an iron bar when she tried to intervene. The appellant, Marcus Nndateni Mulaudzi (third accused), was charged along with three others with murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, and attempted murder. The only evidence implicating the appellant was from the first accused, who made an extra-curial statement (later ruled admissible) and testified that the appellant was part of a conspiracy to rob the deceased and drove the perpetrators to the scene in a Toyota Venture motor vehicle belonging to his employer. The appellant denied involvement and raised an alibi, stating he parked his employer's vehicle after work and went home. On 22 August 2006, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder and robbery (but acquitted him of attempted murder) and sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder and 10 years for robbery.

• Whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder and robbery where the only material evidence was from an accomplice witness
• Whether the trial court properly evaluated the credibility of the first accused's evidence
• Whether the trial court applied the appropriate cautionary rule when dealing with accomplice evidence
• Whether the trial court properly considered the single witness rule where the accomplice was the only witness implicating the appellant
• Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the appellant's alibi evidence

The appeal was upheld. The convictions for murder and robbery, and the related sentences (life imprisonment for murder and 10 years imprisonment for robbery), were set aside. The appellant was effectively acquitted.

Where the only evidence implicating an accused is from an accomplice who is also a single witness, and that witness has been found to be untruthful in material respects while seeking to exculpate himself, the court must apply a strict cautionary rule and the single witness rule. Such evidence must be clear and satisfactory in every material respect and must be corroborated by other evidence implicating the accused. Courts must evaluate all the evidence in its entirety, including the accused's version, and cannot selectively accept portions of accomplice evidence while ignoring conflicting evidence from the accused. An accused's version cannot be rejected unless it is so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true. Acceptance of accomplice evidence and rejection of an accused's evidence is only appropriate where the merits of the former and demerits of the latter are beyond question. Where these standards are not met, the State has failed to discharge the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The court reiterated with approval the dictum from S v Van der Meyden that 'the conclusion which is reached (whether it be to convict or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false; some of it might be found to be unreliable; and some of it might be found to be only possibly false or unreliable; but none of it may simply be ignored.' The court also emphasized the special danger of convicting on accomplice evidence, noting that an accomplice 'is not merely a witness with a possible motive to tell lies about an innocent accused but is such a witness peculiarly equipped, by reason of his inside knowledge of the crime, to convince the unwary that his lies are the truth.' The court observed that where a witness who is also an accused makes a very poor impression and gives evidence lacking in consistency and quality, and appears prone to exonerating himself at the expense of his co-accused, particular caution is required.

This case reinforces critical principles in South African criminal law regarding the evaluation of evidence, particularly: (1) the duty of courts to consider all evidence and not selectively accept parts while ignoring conflicting evidence; (2) the stringent cautionary rule applicable to accomplice evidence, especially where the accomplice is the sole witness implicating an accused; (3) the requirement that single witness evidence must be clear and satisfactory in every material respect; (4) the principle that an accused's version cannot be rejected unless found to be so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true; and (5) that acceptance of accomplice evidence and rejection of an accused's evidence is only appropriate where the merits of the former and demerits of the latter are beyond question. The case demonstrates the appellate court's willingness to overturn convictions where fundamental misdirections in the evaluation of evidence have occurred.