The appellants were trustees of the Century City Property Investment Trust. The respondent, Ms Deans, was formerly married to one of the trustees and was a beneficiary of the Trust during the marriage. In the 2013 and 2014 tax years the Trust realised capital gains from property sales and resolved to allocate income to beneficiaries, including amounts totalling R6 329 939 allocated to Ms Deans. These allocations were reflected as vested liabilities in the Trust’s 2017 financial statements. Ms Deans sued for payment and applied for summary judgment. Her particulars of claim were based on an amended trust deed from 2015, although the allocations occurred before that deed came into effect and were governed by the original 2006 trust deed. The High Court granted summary judgment, finding that the trustees had not disclosed a bona fide defence. The trustees appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was upheld with costs. The High Court order granting summary judgment was set aside and replaced with an order refusing summary judgment, granting the defendants leave to defend the main action, and ordering costs to be costs in the cause.
The case clarifies the strict approach to summary judgment under rule 32, reaffirming that a plaintiff must correctly plead and verify the cause of action relied upon. It confirms that courts may not grant summary judgment on a materially different basis from that pleaded, even if the parties argue on that basis. The judgment also reinforces the low threshold for defendants to defeat summary judgment by disclosing a bona fide, legally sustainable defence.