The applicant, Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, sought to review and set aside an arbitration award issued by the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (Second Respondent) in favour of the first respondent, Mr Motlohi Tshediso Samuel Ramoshebi, who was employed as General Manager: Human Resources. Following an incident in April 2022, the Municipality issued a notice of intent to suspend Ramoshebi but abandoned the process after accepting his representations. Sixteen months later, in September 2023, the Municipality issued a precautionary suspension based on unrelated administrative allegations. The subsequent charges, however, pertained solely to the original April 2022 conduct. A disciplinary chairperson dismissed the charges in January 2024 due to undue delay and ordered the suspension lifted, but the Municipality defied the binding ruling and re-charged Ramoshebi in February 2024 whilst repeatedly extending his suspension. None of the suspension notices bore the concurrence of a National Cabinet Representative (NCR) as required by a Cabinet intervention notice issued under section 139(5) of the Constitution. The arbitrator found the suspension constituted an unfair labour practice under section 186(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, ordered its upliftment, and awarded Ramoshebi compensation of R749,394.16. The Municipality launched a review under section 145 of the LRA, raising four grounds concerning waiver, recusal, ignored evidence, and the void ab initio effect of the lack of NCR concurrence.
Condonation for the late filing of the applicant's Heads of Argument was granted. The review application was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to comply with the arbitration award within 14 days, including payment of compensation of R749,394.16 plus interest from 31 May 2024, and to pay the first respondent's costs.
A review under section 145 of the LRA requires a holistic assessment of whether the award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach; an error is fatal only if it materially distorted the arbitrator's conception of the inquiry and rendered the outcome unreasonable. The doctrine of waiver applies in unfair labour practice disputes concerning suspension, not only in dismissal disputes. An employer who expressly submits an issue to an arbitrator cannot later complain that the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by determining it. A precautionary suspension issued without mandatory NCR concurrence under a valid Cabinet intervention notice is void ab initio because the concurrence requirement is jurisdictional, not merely procedural. Multiple independent findings in an arbitration award can sustain a conclusion of unfairness even if one particular finding is excised. A review court will not re-evaluate the weight of evidence or substitute its own factual findings for those of the arbitrator.
The Commissioner's characterisation of the SALGBC's fourteen-day filing rule as a jurisdictional bar was imprecise; lateness is better analysed as a factor to be weighed in the interests of justice rather than a jurisdictional terminus. The Court expressed no final view on whether clause 16.4 of the DPCA permits unlimited suspension extensions once a disciplinary hearing has commenced, as it was unnecessary to decide this given the other sustaining findings. The Court observed that the Municipality's conduct reflected a sustained institutional pattern of non-compliance and disregard for lawful process extending beyond mere legal error, which justified an adverse costs order in the interests of law and fairness.
The judgment reinforces the holistic, result-based reasonableness test for reviewing arbitration awards under section 145 of the LRA and cautions against fragmented, piecemeal analyses that resemble appeals. It confirms that the doctrine of waiver is not confined to dismissal disputes but applies to unfair labour practice disputes concerning precautionary suspension. The decision clarifies that NCR concurrence requirements under a section 139(5) Cabinet intervention notice are jurisdictional for delegated disciplinary decisions, such that suspension without concurrence is void ab initio. It further underscores the binding nature of disciplinary rulings under collective agreements (DPCA clause 8.5) and the prohibition on re-charging dismissed misconduct (clause 8.6). The Court marked the Municipality's pattern of defying binding rulings, recycling abandoned charges, and bypassing mandatory concurrence as an institutional disregard for lawful process warranting an adverse costs order.